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1 Introduction
Until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, the Eurosystem1 used to
provide just enough liquidity to euro area credit institutions sufficient to cover
the structural liquidity deficit of the banking sector as a whole.2 Different
bank-individual liquidity needs were balanced efficiently through the inter-
bank market for reserves at an interbank rate fluctuating close to the rate
on the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations, i.e. to the rate on those
credit operations by which the Eurosystem provided the bulk of liquidity to
the banking sector. The overnight interbank market thus played an important
role for monetary policy implementation. It served as the starting point of
the monetary policy transmission mechanism. By steering the interest rate in
this market, the central bank aimed to affect banks’ funding costs in order to
influence bank loan supply and thereby aggregate demand and thus the price
level in the euro area.
However, with the beginning of the financial crisis, the seizing up of the
overnight interbank market could be observed.3 For various reasons, trading
in this market became more expensive. Search costs increased as finding coun-
terparties with matching liquidity needs became more difficult due, for exam-
ple, to reduced credit lines among banks.4 Also, asymmetric information costs
rose as uncertainty about the credit risk of interbank lending increased so that
banks intensified their costly creditworthiness checks of potential borrowers,
who in turn increased the costly signaling of their creditworthiness.5 Another
potential source of higher interbank trading costs may be found in new fi-
nancial regulations.6 As the interbank thus was no longer able to distribute
1The term “Eurosystem” stands for the institution which is responsible for monetary
policy in the euro area, namely the ECB and the national central banks in the euro area.
For the sake of simplicity, the terms “ECB” and “Eurosystem” are used interchangeably
throughout this paper.
2Euro area credit institutions need central bank liquidity (reserves) for three reasons:
to fulfill the reserve requirements imposed by the Eurosystem, to cope with so called au-
tonomous factors (such as banknotes in circulation), and to settle payment transactions in
the form of deposit transfers between bank customers of different institutions. The first two
factors create a structural liquidity deficit of the banking sector which can only be covered
by the Eurosystem. The deposit transfer payments, on the other hand, do not contribute to
this liquidity deficit as resulting different bank-individual liquidity needs can be balanced
through an interbank market. For a description of the credit institutions’ demand for and
the Eurosystem’s supply of liquidity before the financial crisis see European Central Bank
(2002).
3For a recent documentation on stress in the overnight interbank market in the euro
area over the course of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe see, for example,
Frutos et al (2016).
4There are a couple of recently published papers that have developed interbank market
models dealing with the search for suitable counterparties and bilateral negotiations. See,
for example, Afonso and Lagos (2015), Bech and Monnet (2016), and Vollmer and Wiese
(2016).
5Consequences of asymmetric information in interbank markets are analyzed, for exam-
ple, in Freixas and Jorge (2008) and Heider et al (2015).
6For a recent discussion on the influence of new financial regulations on interbank market
conditions see, for example, Bech and Keister (2013), Jackson and Noss (2015), Bank for
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liquidity efficiently, banks increased their demand for reserves and started to
accumulate large amounts of liquidity on their accounts with the central bank.
This was possible as with the beginning of the financial crisis, the Eurosystem
gave banks access to unlimited central bank liquidity at a fixed rate against
eligible collateral. The high levels of excess liquidity observed in the euro area
during the period from 2008 until 2012 were thus mainly demand-driven (Baldo
et al, 2017). Banks actively demanded relatively huge amounts of liquidity,
and this demand was totally satisfied by the Eurosystem.7 This paper refers
to such demand-driven excess liquidity holdings being the consequence of an
imperfectly functioning interbank market for reserves.
Due to the importance of this interbank market for monetary policy imple-
mentation, the observed stress in this market raised concerns about the central
bank’s ability to actually influence bank loan supply and triggered a heated
debate on the potential impairment of the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy and the consequences for monetary policy implementation.8 Our
paper aims to contribute to this debate by analysing the impact of overnight
interbank market frictions on bank loan supply and by discussing resulting
implications for monetary policy implementation. We develop a theoretical
model in which banks have to decide on their loan supply to the non-banking
sector in the presence of bank idiosyncratic liquidity risk and interbank market
frictions. We capture the frictions in the form of broadly defined transaction
costs. These costs may include search costs, asymmetric information costs and
regulatory costs, i.e., similar to Bartolini et al (2001), we argue that frictions
make interbank trading more expensive.9
International Settlements, Committee on the Global Financial System (2015), and Bindseil
(2016).
7Since 2015, excess liquidity in the banking sector has increased again and has reached
by now (October 2018) unprecedented levels. However, this rise in excess liquidity is largely
supply-driven as it is mainly the result of the Eurosystem’s large-scale asset purchases which
started in 2015 to address the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation (Baldo et al,
2017).
8The importance of the interbank market for the implementation and the transmission
of monetary policy is pointed out, for example, by Heider et al (2015) and Frutos et al (2016)
before they analyze the mal-functioning of this market in more detail. Freixas and Jorge
(2008) show that an imperfect interbank market may lead to rationing in credit markets
and thus may reinforce the impact of monetary policy on aggregate investment. Iyer et al
(2014) argue that during the financial crisis, problems in the European interbank market
had a negative impact on credit supply of those banks depending on interbank borrowing.
And the ECB points out that a mal-functioning interbank market is a problem for the
transmission of monetary policy and refers to interbank market problems when justifying
the introduction of non-standard monetary policy measure (see, for example, European
Central Bank (2009, 2010)).
9In our model, there is not an adverse selection problem due to asymmetric informa-
tion as this would mean that lending to the overnight interbank market involves credit risk.
However, in the overnight interbank market, lenders are typically unwilling to expose them-
selves to any counterparty credit risk as even for the slightest risk, the adequate interest
rate is much higher than the rate on the alternative liquidity source, the central bank’s
lending facility (see Hauck and Neyer (2014) for a numerical example). We thus assume
that asymmetric information leads to costly creditworthiness checks and costly signaling to
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We find that interbank market frictions negatively influence bank loan sup-
ply. However, they do not impede the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy. By means of its standing facilities, the central bank is able to influence
banks’ expected liquidity costs, and thus their loan supply, also in the presence
of significant, even prohibitive interbank market transaction costs. The reason
is twofold. First, with its standing facilities the central bank provides an alter-
native to using the costly interbank market.10 Second, by setting the rates on
its facilities the central bank determines the costs and therefore the amount of
friction-induced holdings of positive or negative precautionary liquidity. The
more precautionary liquidity (in absolute terms) banks hold, the lower their
expected liquidity costs are. In our theoretical analysis, banks’ holdings of pre-
cautionary liquidity play a crucial role. Banks will hold precautionary liquidity
if interbank market frictions are sufficiently strong and if the expected costs of
a liquidity deficit and of a liquidity surplus are asymmetric. Frictions will be
sufficiently strong if they make interbank trading so expensive that at least one
market side prefers to use the central bank’s facilities, unless the other market
side is willing to bear a higher share of the transaction costs. The asymmetric
expected costs of a deficit and of a surplus may result from different probabil-
ities of facing a deficit/surplus, stigma or regulatory costs which are relevant
only to one interbank market side, or an asymmetric interest corridor formed
by the rates on the central bank’s standing facilities around the main policy
rate. If banks expect a deficit to be more expensive than a surplus, they will
hold positive precautionary liquidity, i.e., more liquidity than they expect to
need. Otherwise they will hold negative precautionary liquidity.
Our model captures main elements of the ECB’s monetary policy toolkit:
its main refinancing operations and its two standing facilities. The main refi-
nancing operations are credit operations with a maturity of one week by which
the Eurosystem provides reserves to the banking sector. Starting from Octo-
ber 2008 the amount of this liquidity provision was not restricted, but, against
adequate collateral, banks received the amount they asked for (fixed-rate full
allotment). The two standing facilities, a deposit facility and a lending facility,
allow banks to balance their overnight liquidity needs. The interest rates on
the facilities form a corridor around the rate on the main refinancing opera-
tions with a deposit rate that is lower and a lending rate that is higher than
the main refinancing rate. Before the Great Recession, the width of this corri-
dor was 200 basis points. Starting from May 2009 the Eurosystem reduced the
width first symmetrically and later asymmetrically with the main refinancing
eliminate the asymmetries, so that those overnight interbank market transactions actually
taking place are risk-free.
10If banks make use of this alternative, the central bank will become an intermediary
between liquidity deficit and surplus banks, i.e., interbank market activities will decline. In
this context Bindseil (2016), among others, points to the trade-off between the central bank’s
aim to control the interbank rate (narrow interest corridor) and to maintain market activities
(wide interest corridor). In the same vein, in our model a trade-off between boosting bank
loan supply and maintaining interbank market activity could be discussed. While our paper
does not broach this trade-off, it does focus on the impact of monetary policy measures on
bank loan supply.
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rate moving closer to the deposit rate. As of October 2018, the width of the
corridor amounts to 65 basis points. Since the interbank market froze during
the financial crisis both the deposit and the lending facilities have been used
to a considerable extent. Whereas the lending facility is now less frequently
used, banks still place a significant share of their excess reserves in the deposit
facility even though the deposit rate is negative.11
Based on our model, we can draw some conclusions for the ECB’s monetary
policy and bank loan supply in the euro area. From the beginning of the finan-
cial crisis up to now (October 2018) the ECB has not only significantly reduced
banks’ expected liquidity costs by lowering its key interest rates. By reducing
the width of the corridor and switching to an asymmetric corridor later on,
it has also lowered banks’ friction-induced liquidity costs substantially. The
ECB’s monetary policy has thus prevented interbank market frictions from
becoming an impediment to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Consequently, these frictions have not been responsible for weak bank lending
observed in the euro area.
It should be noted that although our model captures main elements of
the Eurosystem’s operational framework, our main results also apply to other
central banks’ operational frameworks. Crucial is that banks facing stochastic
deposit flows are induced to use the central bank’s facilities to balance their
actual liquidity position.12
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents related
literature. Section 3 describes the framework of the model. Section 4 derives
the optimal liquidity management and optimal loan supply of an individual
bank. Depending on the extent of interbank market frictions, three possible
aggregate equilibria are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the impact
of different monetary policy measures on bank loan supply. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. The first strand analyzes
how far frictions in financial markets influence the impact of monetary policy
on bank lending. A huge part of this literature considers asymmetric informa-
tion in credit markets and argues that these frictions amplify the effects of
monetary policy on bank lending and therefore on aggregate demand.13
11For a detailed description of the Eurosystem’s operational framework see, for example,
European Central Bank (2012a) and the ECB’s website. For a description of a use of the
Eurosystem’s instruments since 2009 see Eser et al (2012) and Alvarez et al (2017).
12In the USA, for example, banks can use the Federal Reserve System’s discount window
to balance a liquidity deficit, which is comparable to the Eurosystem’s lending facility.
Furthermore, the Federal Reserve System pays interest on excess reserves (IOER rate). This
procedure is comparable to the remuneration of reserves in the Eurosystem’s deposit facility.
13For a survey on this credit view of monetary policy see, for example, Boivin et al
(2010) and Peek and Rosengreen (2012). One part of this credit view of monetary policy,
the balance sheet channel, focuses on the impact of monetary policy on borrowers’ net worth.
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The second strand of related literature deals with interbank market fric-
tions. Until the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the overnight interbank
market was typically regarded as frictionless. As a result, papers dealing with
this issue were rather rare. One of these papers is by Bartolini et al (2001).
They consider interbank market transaction costs and show that these costs
are responsible for a systematically high interbank rate at the end of reserve
maintenance periods. However, the financial crisis inspired a rapidly grow-
ing literature dealing with interbank market imperfections. Freixas and Jorge
(2008) show that asymmetric information about credit risk in the interbank
market may induce the rationing of firms in credit markets, which leads first
to a large impact of monetary policy on aggregate investment given the small
interest elasticity of investment and second to a stronger impact on banks
with less liquid balance sheets. Heider et al (2015) argue that asymmetric in-
formation about credit risk in the interbank market induces banks to hoard
liquidity which may result in either adverse selection or a dry-up in the in-
terbank market. However, banks may learn about counterparty credit risks
by repeatedly trading with each other so that the asymmetric information
problem may be mitigated. In an empirical analysis of the German unsecured
overnight interbank market, Bräuning and Fecht (2017) determine the im-
pact of such relationship lending on banks’ ability to access liquidity. Iyer
et al (2014) show that the contractionary effect of the impaired functioning of
the Portuguese interbank market during the crisis on bank loan supply was
stronger with banks which had less relationship lending. Besides Heider et al
(2015), there are further papers that analyze how far interbank market fric-
tions induce banks to hold precautionary liquidity. Ashcraft et al (2011) show
that credit constraints and limited participation in combination with possible
payment shocks can explain the precautionary holding of liquidity. Referring
to the term interbank market, Acharya and Skeie (2011) trace precautionary
liquidity holdings of potential lending banks back to the rollover risk of their
own debt. Considering the overnight interbank market in the UK, Acharya
and Merrouche (2012) argue that impaired markets for wholesale funding also
lead to precautionary holding of liquidity. Allen et al (2009) show that if un-
certainty about aggregate liquidity demand compared to idiosyncratic demand
is sufficiently high, banks will start to hoard liquidity.
The third strand of related literature deals with the interbank market and
monetary policy implementation.14 For monetary policy implementation the
overnight interbank market plays a crucial role. The seminal paper in this lit-
erature is by Poole (1968). He develops a stochastic bank reserve management
Seminal papers dealing with the balance sheet channel are Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and
Bernanke et al (1999). The other part of the credit view, the bank lending channel, focuses on
the impact on bank deposits. Important papers dealing with this traditional bank lending
channel are Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1995). Disyatat (2011)
shows that a greater reliance on market-based funding instead of deposits creates a new
approach to the bank lending channel.
14For a survey see, for example, Friedman and Kuttner (2011). By describing and dis-
cussing different parts of a central bank’s operational framework, Bindseil (2014) gives a
broad survey of monetary policy implementation in times of non-crisis and crisis.
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model in which banks are subject to a late payment shock, i.e., a liquidity
shock which occurs after the closure of the interbank market. Banks ending
the day with a liquidity deficit have to borrow from the central bank at a rate
that is high relative to the interbank rate. Those banks ending with a liquidity
surplus face forgone interest revenues from lending to the interbank market.
Under uncertainty the banks, aiming to maximise their expected profit, thus
have to decide on their optimal interbank market transactions. Poole’s idea
of using a late payment shock to introduce uncertainty into a bank reserve
management model has been taken up by lots of papers.15 Generally, prior to
the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007, the literature on monetary policy
implementation focuses on specific institutional aspects to explain interbank
market participant behaviour and determinants of the interbank rate. Ho and
Saunders (1985) and Clouse and Dow (2002), for example, consider major in-
stitutional characteristics of the US federal funds market. With respect to the
federal funds market, a huge part of the literature analyzes why the federal
funds rate fails to follow a martingale within the reserve maintenance period.16
A bulk of the literature on monetary policy implementation in the euro area
deals with the under- and overbidding behaviour in the Eurosystem’s main
refinancing operations which could be observed in the first years of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union.17 Apart from this, there are papers that examine the
consequences of alternative monetary policy implementation measures. Nautz
(1998) shows that the central bank can influence the interbank market rate by
being more or less vague about its future monetary policy. Välimäki (2001) an-
alyzes the effects of alternative tender procedures with respect to the Eurosys-
tem’s refinancing operations. Neyer and Wiemers (2004) refer to the collateral
framework. They show that differences in banks’ opportunity costs of holding
collateral form a rationale for the existence of an interbank market for reserves.
Neyer (2009) demonstrates that a specific remuneration of required reserves
increases the flexibility of monetary policy. Since 2008 a huge literature has
evolved dealing with monetary policy implementation during the financial cri-
sis.18 Borio and Disyatat (2009) emphasise the importance of the central bank
balance sheet size in the implemented non-standard policy measures. Cheun
et al (2009) consider changes to the collateral frameworks of the Eurosystem,
the Federal Reserve System, and the Bank of England. Lenza et al (2010)
describe the different ways in which these three central banks generally con-
ducted monetary policy during the financial crisis. Eisenschmidt et al (2009)
15See, for example, Furfine (2000), Bindseil et al (2006), Whitesell (2006), and Bech and
Monnet (2016).
16See, for example, Campbell (1987), Hamilton (1996), Clouse and Dow (1999), Furfine
(2000), and Bartolini et al (2001, 2002).
17Under- and overbidding behaviour refers to a bidding behaviour in which total bids
significantly deviate from the Eurosystem’s benchmark allotment. Analyses with respect to
this under- and overbidding behaviour can be found in, for example, Ayuso and Repullo
(2001, 2003), Ewerhart (2002), Nautz and Oechssler (2003, 2006), and Bindseil (2005).
18For a description of the implementation of monetary policy by the Eurosystem in
response to the financial crisis, see European Central Bank (2009, 2010, 2011, 2012b, 2014,
2015).
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analyze the relatively aggressive bidding behaviour of banks in the ECB’s main
refinancing operations at the beginning of the financial turmoil. Referring to
the first part of the financial crisis (until 2008) too, Cassola and Huetl (2010)
assess the effectiveness of monetary policy implementation during that time.
Hauck and Neyer (2014) develop a theoretical model that considers the main
institutional features of the ECB’s operational framework, which has been in
place since September 2008 to explain several stylized facts observed during
the financial crisis. Bech and Monnet (2016) develop a search-based model of
an over-the-counter (OTC) interbank market which also allows to explain sev-
eral stylized facts observed in the euro area between 2009 and 2015. In their
model, banks are exposed to settlement risk, which is comparable to Poole’s
late payment shock. This risk is responsible for the banks’ use of the central
bank’s standing facilities. The literature emphasizing an active role of the cen-
tral bank’s standing facilities in monetary policy implementation is still rather
new. Pérez-Quirós and Rodŕıguez-Mendizábal (2006) show that the standing
facilities offered by the ECB, in combination with its minimum reserve system,
is an effective instrument to stabilise the interbank rate. Whitesell (2006) looks
at a minimum reserve system and standing facilities as two alternative regimes
for controlling overnight interest rates. Berentsen and Monnet (2008) develop
a general equilibrium framework and show that changing the rates on these
facilities may be actively used as a monetary policy instrument. Colliard et al
(2017) develop a core-periphery model of an OTC overnight interbank market.
They argue that in a crisis a segmentation between core and periphery markets
leads to a problematic dispersion of interbank rates, requiring the central bank
to implement a floor operating system with respect to their interest corridor.19
Using a theoretical model, Link and Neyer (2017) show that interbank mar-
ket transaction cost heterogeneity (bank- and time-specific) leads to interbank
rate volatility, and they discuss possibilities for the central bank to control the
volatility using alternative interest corridor systems. Alper et al (2013), Kara
(2016), and Küçük et al (2016) describe and discuss the active role assigned
to the interest corridor in the operational framework of the Turkish Central
Bank that uses the interest corridor to smooth the volatility of cross-border
capital flows, i.e., as a monetary policy tool for macroprudential purposes.
Our paper combines all three described strands of literature. The novelty
of our paper is that it provides a theoretical model that explicitly links bank
credit supply to interbank market frictions considering main elements of the
Eurosystem’s operational framework. This allows us to discuss implications
for monetary policy implementation. With respect to the latter, we emphasise
the active role of the central bank’s standing facilities. We argue that they
not only provide an alternative to the costly interbank market for balancing
liquidity positions but the facility rates also determine the costs of friction-
induced holdings of positive or negative precautionary liquidity.
19In a floor operating system the central bank injects ample liquidity into the banking
system, so that excess liquidity drives the interbank rate down to its lower bound, the rate
on the deposit facility.
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3 Setup
The aim of the model is to shed light on lending and reserve management
decisions of commercial banks in a setting that is institutionally rich in terms
of a central bank’s monetary policy tools and interbank market frictions. The
model is short term in nature. It captures the duration of a central bank’s refi-
nancing operation. Our model economy is populated by three types of agents.
There is a central bank, a continuum of measure one of price-taking, risk-
neutral commercial banks, and a large number of bank customers.
3.1 Bank Loan Supply, Banks’ Money Creation, and Banks’ Liquidity Needs
The commercial banks offer loans to their customers. The loan supply of an
individual commercial bank is denoted by Lb. The interest rate a customer
has to pay for a bank loan is iL. Managing these loans generates costs 12λL
2
b
for a bank. The quadratic form of this cost function captures the idea that
loans differ in their complexity so that a bank adds the least complex loans
to its portfolio first. By making loans, banks create money. They credit the
respective amount to their customers’ deposit accounts. Bank customers can
hold this newly created money on their accounts or use it to make payments.
They can pay in cash, in which case they have to withdraw the respective
amount of cash from their accounts, or by bank transfer.
The share of the new money used for cash payments is captured by the
currency ratio c. Consequently, each bank faces a loss of deposits due to cash
withdrawals equal to cLb. The cash withdrawals generate a structural liquidity
deficit for the whole banking sector that can only be covered by the central
bank, that is the monopoly producer of currency.
In contrast, bank transfer payments do not generate a structural liquidity
deficit of the banking sector as a whole, as one bank’s deposit outflow is another
bank’s deposit inflow. However, a single bank may lose or gain deposits. The
loss or gain in deposits is expressed as share χtb of the remaining deposits
(1 − c)Lb with χ being a scale parameter and tb denoting the bank transfer
ratio. If tb > 0, the bank will face a deposit outflow due to the bank customers’
transfer payments. If tb < 0, there will be a deposit inflow. To sum up, a bank’s
liquidity needs resulting from cash withdrawals and bank transfer payments
are
(c+ (1− c)χtb)Lb. (1)
While the currency ratio is the same for each bank, the bank transfer ratio
differs across banks. It is the realization of the random variable t̃b which is
distributed across banks according to the distribution function G(tb), with
density g(tb), support [t
min, tmax], and −1 ≤ tmin < 0 < tmax ≤ 1. The scale
parameter χ with χ ∈ (0, 1tmax ] reflects the dispersion of the distribution of
χtb.
20 As a deposit outflow of one bank corresponds to a respective inflow of
20As the share χtb cannot exceed one, χ is restricted to
1
tmax
.
10 Monika Bucher et al.
another bank, the expected value of a bank’s transfer ratio is
E[tb] =
∫ tmax
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb = 0. (2)
In our analysis we have to specify whether G(0) is higher, smaller or equal
to 0.5. Further specifications of G(tb) are not necessary. If G(0) = 0.5, the
probability that a bank faces a deposit outflow will equal the probability of
facing a deposit inflow. If G(0) < 0.5 (G(0) > 0.5), the probability of facing
a deposit outflow is larger (smaller) than the probability of facing a deposit
inflow. Figure 1 illustrates three possible distributions of t̃b implying differ-
ent probabilities of facing a deposit outflow and a deposit inflow respectively.
If there is a symmetric distribution of t̃b around tb = 0, the probability of
facing a deposit outflow will equal the probability of facing a deposit inflow,
G(0) = 0.5. If there is a right-skewed (left-skewed) distribution of t̃b, the prob-
ability of facing a deposit inflow is larger (smaller) than of facing a deposit
outflow, G(0) > 0.5 (G(0) < 0.5). Note that Figure 1 only illustrates possible
distributions of t̃b. It is neither necessary to have a symmetric distribution of
t̃b around tb = 0 to have G(0) = 0.5, nor is it necessary to have a right-skewed
(left-skewed) distribution to have G(0) > 0.5 (G(0) < 0.5). However, for the
sake of a clearer presentation we will refer to a symmetric distribution of t̃b if
G(0) = 0.5 and to an asymmetric distribution if G(0) 6= 0.5. In our analysis,
the possible asymmetry of the distribution plays a crucial role as it may imply
that banks hold precautionary liquidity.
deposit inflow deposit outflow
𝑡 𝑡
𝑔 𝑡
𝑡
deposit inflow deposit outflow
E[𝑡 ]=0𝑡 𝑡
𝑔 𝑡
𝑡
deposit inflow deposit outflow
𝑡 𝑡
𝑔 𝑡
𝑡
(a) Symmetric Distribution,
𝐺 0 0.5
(b) Right-Skewed Distribution,
𝐺 0 0.5
(c) Left-Skewed Distribution,
𝐺 0 0.5
E[𝑡 ]=0E[𝑡 ]=0
Fig. 1 Symmetric and Asymmetric Distributions of t̃b
A bank balances its liquidity needs as specified in (1) by transacting with
the central bank and/or in the interbank market. To obtain liquidity from
the central bank, a bank can participate in the central bank’s refinancing
operations and borrow the amount ROb at the policy rate i
RO. The central
bank fully satisfies a bank’s liquidity demand in these operations. A bank can
also use a lending facility to borrow LFb at the rate i
LF .21 In addition, it can
21Generally, credit operations with the central bank require adequate collateral. However,
the collateralization of central bank credits would not qualitatively change our results (see
section 6.5 for details) so that, for the sake of simplicity, we ignore this aspect in our model.
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place an amount DFb of liquidity in a deposit facility offered by the central
bank at the rate iDF . The rates on the facilities form a corridor around the
policy rate iRO with iLF > iRO > iDF .
A bank’s position in the interbank market is Bb. If Bb > 0, the bank
will borrow the amount Bb at the rate i
IBM . Conversely, Bb < 0 indicates
that the bank will lend the amount |Bb| at this rate. If it borrows or lends in
the interbank market, transaction costs γ |Bb| will accrue, with γ ≥ 0. These
transaction costs are broadly defined as explicated in the introduction.
3.2 Informational Structure, Sequence of Events, and Optimization Problem
As our focus is on the loan supply and the liquidity management of commercial
banks, we do not explicitly model how the interest rate iL for bank loans
is determined or the central bank sets its policy rates iRO, iLF and iDF .
Instead, these rates are exogenously given and known to commercial banks.
The same holds true with regard to the currency ratio c. The interbank rate
iIBM is endogenously determined by supply and demand in this market. Our
model is a one-period model with four events (see Figure 2). The timing and
sequence of events during this period are as follows. At the beginning of this
period, each bank decides on its loan supply Lb and its borrowing from the
central bank’s refinancing operations ROb. At this time, each bank does not yet
know the realization of the transfer ratio and, therefore, its individual liquidity
needs. However, it knows the distribution of t̃b, so that it can form respective
expectations. After each bank has decided on Lb and ROb, bank customers
withdraw cash and make their bank transfer payments, i.e. each bank learns its
individual tb. Then, each bank has to decide whether to balance its resulting
liquidity position by using the interbank market Bb and/or the central bank’s
facilities LFb and DFb. At the end of the period, all contracts mature without
default.
Our one-period model thus captures the euro area banks’ liquidity man-
agement within the Eurosystem’s operational framework over one week. The
first event reflects the euro area banks’ possibility to borrow liquidity from
the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations at the beginning of a week. At
each day during the rest of the week euro area banks face deposit inflows
and outflows due to their customers’ payments. Banks balance the resulting
liquidity deficit/surplus overnight by using the interbank market and/or the
central bank’s facilities at the end of each day. Our model subsumes the daily
deposit inflows/outflows and the interbank market/facility transactions dur-
ing the rest of the week in two events: first, customers’ payments and second,
banks’ use of the interbank market/central bank’s facilities.
When deciding on its activities, each bank seeks to maximize its expected
profit.22 The sequence of events implies that each bank faces a two-stage op-
22In our model setup, maximizing a bank’s expected profit is equivalent to maximizing
its expected final net wealth. At the beginning of the considered period, each bank has an
empty balance sheet, i.e., its net wealth is zero. During the period, a bank grants loans,
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Event 1 Event 2 Event 3
Banks decide on 𝐿
and 𝑅𝑂 . First stage of
a bank‘s optimization
problem.
Bank customers make
their pay‐ments (cash 
with‐drawals and deposit
transfers), so that banks
face different liquidity
needs
c 1 c χ?̃? 𝐿 .
Banks decide on 𝐿𝐹 , 
𝐷𝐹 and 𝐵 . Second 
stage of a bank‘s
optimization problem. 
Interbank rate is
determined.
All contracts
mature.
Event 4
One Period
Fig. 2 Sequence of Events within a Period
timization problem that can be solved by backward induction. At the second
stage, a bank aims to minimise its liquidity costs Cb of using the interbank
market and the facilities, taking the interbank rate, the policy rates as well as
its liquidity needs as given. This optimization problem reads
min
Bb∈R;LFb,DFb∈R+0
Cb (Bb,LFb,DFb) = i
IBMBb + γ|Bb|
+ iLFLFb − iDFDFb (3)
s.t. (c+ (1− c)χtb)Lb −ROb = Bb + LFb −DFb. (4)
The first two components of the cost function (3) reflect a bank’s costs and pos-
sible revenues resulting from its transactions in the interbank market. The last
two components represent its costs and revenues of using the central bank’s fa-
cilities. Equation (4) describes a bank’s balance sheet constraint. The left-hand
side (LHS) reflects a bank’s liquidity position at the beginning of the second
stage, while the right-hand side (RHS) shows how this position is balanced.
At the first stage, each bank aims to maximise its expected profit. Denoting
the respective objective function by f and indicating the optimum variables
of the second stage by the superscript opt, the optimization problem reads
max
Lb,ROb∈R+0
f(Lb,ROb) = i
LLb − 12λL
2
b − iROROb
− E
[
Cb
(
Boptb ,LF
opt
b ,DF
opt
b
)]
. (5)
The first term of the objective function shows a bank’s interest revenues from
making loans to the non-banking sector. The second term describes its man-
agement costs. The third term reflects the liquidity costs which accrue from
creates deposits, conducts transactions with the central bank and with other banks on the
interbank market. All these contracts mature at the end of the period. As there are no
defaults, the bank’s net wealth at the end of the period equals the profit it has made with
these activities.
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borrowing from the central bank’s refinancing operation. The last term repre-
sents the expected liquidity costs of using the interbank market and the central
bank’s facilities. Note that at this stage, bank customers have not made their
payments yet. Accordingly, all banks are identical; they face the same opti-
mization problem and thus form the same expectations about their subsequent
liquidity needs.
To identify the subgame perfect equilibrium of the model, we proceed in
two major steps. In a first step, we focus on the optimal behavior of a single
bank, i.e. we solve its two-stage optimization problem, taking the interbank
rate as given.23 Then, at the aggregate level, we determine the equilibrium
interbank rate iIBM as well as aggregate borrowing from the refinancing op-
eration and bank loan supply. We focus on equilibria in which the equilibrium
interbank rate has two key characteristics. From an ex-post perspective, it bal-
ances aggregate supply and aggregate demand in the interbank market. From
an ex-ante perspective, it is consistent with the interbank rate commercial
banks base their decisions on at the first stage.
4 Optimal Behaviour of a Single Bank
To derive a bank’s optimal behaviour, we solve the optimization problem
by backward induction. First, we investigate the second stage determining
a bank’s optimal behaviour on the interbank market and its optimal use of
the central bank’s facilities. Then, we analyze the first stage and derive a
bank’s optimal borrowing from the central bank’s refinancing operations and
its optimal loan supply to the non-banking sector.
4.1 Optimal Behaviour at the Second Stage
Considering (1) and a bank’s borrowing from the central bank’s refinancing
operations, its liquidity position at the beginning of the second stage is
Nb := (c+ (1− c)χtb)Lb −ROb R 0. (6)
If Nb > 0, the bank will face a liquidity deficit which has to be balanced by
borrowing from the interbank market and/or the lending facility. Therefore,
the bank compares the marginal costs of borrowing from the interbank market
given by iIBM + γ with those of using the lending facility, which are iLF .
The bank will cover its total liquidity deficit by borrowing from the lending
facility if iIBM + γ > iLF . If iIBM + γ ≤ iLF , it will borrow exclusively
from the interbank market. If Nb < 0, there will be a liquidity surplus. The
excess liquidity will be placed in the interbank market or the deposit facility
23Note that we can take the interbank rate as given because a commercial bank can
conclude from its own first-stage behaviour what the aggregate liquidity position in the
banking sector, and thus the consistent equilibrium interbank rate, will be at the second
stage.
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depending on which alternative provides the largest marginal revenues. Note
that if the marginal costs (marginal revenues) of using the interbank market
and of using the central bank’s lending (deposit) facility are identical, the bank
will obviously be indifferent between both options. However, in such a case we
break ties in favor of the interbank market. If the bank’s liquidity position is
balanced (Nb = 0), the bank will use neither the interbank market nor the
facilities. From (6) we can infer that Nb = 0 if
tb =
ROb−cLb
(1−c)χLb =: tb. (7)
We denote tb as the critical bank transfer ratio. This critical ratio plays a
crucial role in our analysis as it determines whether a bank faces a liquidity
deficit or surplus at the beginning of the second stage.
4.2 First Stage: Optimal Borrowing from the Refinancing Operations
The equilibrium interbank rate iIBM∗ must be in the interval
[
iRO − γ, iRO + γ
]
(see comment to proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix). For the sake of a clearer
presentation, we thus exclude interbank rates 6∈
[
iRO − γ, iRO + γ
]
already at
this stage. Solving the optimization problem given by (5) for ROoptb , we then
obtain
Lemma 1 Suppose that the non-negativity constraint on ROb is not bind-
ing.24 Then, differentiating f partially with respect to ROb gives the first-order
condition (FOC) for a bank’s optimal borrowing from the refinancing opera-
tions ROoptb :
iRO = max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}
G
(
t
opt
b
)
+ min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}(
1−G
(
t
opt
b
))
(8)
with t
opt
b =
ROoptb − cL
opt
b
(1− c)χLoptb
. (9)
Proof See appendix.
The LHS of the FOC for a bank’s optimal borrowing from the central
bank’s refinancing operations shows marginal costs, the RHS expected marginal
revenues.25 With probability G(t
opt
b ), a bank will face a liquidity surplus at the
24For the sake of a clearer presentation we do not explicitly consider the non-negativity
constraint on ROb in the presentation of our model, but we will comment on this aspect if
relevant (see footnotes 31 and 38 to 44).
25Note that at the first stage, a bank only forms expectations about the individual liq-
uidity needs it will face at the second stage. The interbank rate is known for certain: All
banks face exactly the same optimization problem at the first stage, so ROoptb is identical
for all banks. As there is no aggregate uncertainty, each bank therefore knows the aggregate
liquidity endowment of the banking sector and thus the interbank rate for any ROoptb .
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beginning of the second stage. In this case, any additional borrowing from the
refinancing operations will generate additional interest revenues (net of possi-
ble transaction costs) as the additional surplus will be lent to the interbank
market or placed in the deposit facility. With probability 1−G(toptb ), a bank
will face a liquidity deficit. Borrowing more from the refinancing operation at
the first stage will reduce the liquidity deficit at the second stage, so that in
this case marginal revenues in the form of avoided illiquidity costs will accrue.
For the following analysis some definitions are useful. First, we denote the
interbank rate that balances marginal costs and expected marginal revenues
of borrowing from the refinancing operations for ROb = cLb by ĩ
IBM . As
ROoptb = cL
opt
b implies that t
opt
b = 0, it follows from (8) that
ĩIBM = iRO − γ(1− 2G(0)). (10)
Second, it is useful to distinguish deviations from a bank’s expected liquidity
needs. Considering (1) and (2), a bank’s expected liquidity needs are cLb. If
a bank borrows more (less) than cLb from the refinancing operations, so that
tb > 0 (tb < 0), it will thus hold positive (negative) precautionary liquidity.
This leads us to
Lemma 2 A bank will hold positive (negative) precautionary liquidity if it
expects for ROb = cLb, i.e., for t̄b = 0, that a deficit will be more (less)
expensive at the margin than a surplus, i.e., if(
iRO −max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
})
G(0)
≷
(
min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}
− iRO
)
(1−G(0)) . (11)
The RHS of (11) presents the expected marginal costs of a deficit, the LHS of a
surplus. From (11) we can conclude that if a bank holds precautionary liquidity,
some kind of asymmetry will be involved. In our model, there are two possible
sources of asymmetry: an asymmetric distribution of t̃b around zero (G(0) 6=
0.5) and an asymmetric interest corridor (iLF − iRO 6= iRO − iDF ). However,
one can think of other possible sources, such as stigma costs when borrowing
from the interbank market or different transaction costs for interbank market
lending and borrowing. Note that for the sake of a less complex presentation
of the proofs of our propositions and results, we assume either the interest
corridor or the distribution of t̃b to be asymmetric or both to be symmetric.
26
Allowing for both to be asymmetric would not change our results. Rearranging
(8), we obtain the FOC for optimal precautionary liquidity holdings:(
iRO −max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
})
G
(
t
opt
b
)
=
(
min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}
− iRO
) (
1−G
(
t
opt
b
))
. (12)
If a bank holds positive precautionary liquidity, the LHS of (12) will represent
its expected marginal costs of holding this liquidity in the form of additional
26See, for example, the proof of Proposition 3 in the appendix.
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interest costs, while the RHS will show its expected marginal revenues in
the form of avoided illiquidity costs. If a bank holds negative precautionary
liquidity, the LHS of (12) will represent the expected marginal revenues of
holding this liquidity in the form of avoided interest costs while the RHS will
show respective expected marginal costs in the form of additional illiquidity
costs.
4.3 First Stage: Optimal Bank Loan Supply
Solving the optimization problem given by (5) for Loptb , we obtain
Lemma 3 Differentiating f partially with respect to Lb and using the result
for optimal borrowing from the refinancing operations for a not binding non-
negativity constraint on ROb given by (8), the FOC for a bank’s optimal loan
supply to the non-banking sector becomes
iL = λLoptb + ci
RO
+ φ(t
opt
b )
[
min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}
−max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}]
, (13)
with t
opt
b defined by (9) and
φ(t
opt
b ) := (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
t
opt
b
tbg(tb) dtb. (14)
Proof See appendix.
The LHS of the FOC for a bank’s optimal loan supply presents the marginal
revenues of granting loans, the RHS expected marginal costs. The latter consist
of the marginal management costs λLoptb and expected marginal liquidity costs.
In the following, we will comment on the latter in more detail.
If a bank increases its loans by one unit, it will face additional certain liq-
uidity needs c because of additional cash withdrawals. These certain liquidity
needs imply certain marginal liquidity costs ciRO. Furthermore, the increase
in loans implies additional uncertain liquidity needs due to uncertain bank
transfer payments (1−c)χt̃b. And although the respective expected additional
liquidity needs are zero as E[tb] = 0, the bank’s expected additional (net)
liquidity costs will be positive if the possible deficit costs are higher than the
possible surplus revenues (in this case, the term in square brackets in (13) will
be positive).
We refer to these costs as the uncertain liquidity costs of granting loans.
Note that if interbank trade is not impaired (γ = 0), uncertain liquidity costs
of granting loans will be zero. The importance of these costs for a bank’s
optimal bank loan supply is reflected by the quantity and probability weight
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φ(t
opt
b ).
27 Consequently, the last term in the FOC (13) presents the expected
marginal uncertain liquidity costs of granting loans.
In our analysis, it plays a crucial role that the weight φ(t
opt
b ), and thus
the expected marginal uncertain liquidity costs of granting loans, decrease in
a bank’s holdings of positive as well as negative precautionary liquidity:
∂φ(t
opt
b )
∂t
opt
b
= −(1− c)χtoptb g(t
opt
b )
{
< 0 if t
opt
b > 0,
> 0 if t
opt
b < 0.
(15)
5 Aggregate Equilibrium
5.1 Interbank Rate
After having clarified the optimal behaviour of an individual bank, we are now
in a position to look at the aggregate equilibrium.28 At the second stage, each
bank will only trade liquidity in the interbank market if this is more beneficial
than using the respective facility. All variables and parameters determining
this decision are the same for all banks. Consequently, if iIBM − γ < iDF , all
banks with a liquidity surplus will place their excess liquidity in the deposit
facility, while for iIBM +γ > iLF , all banks with a liquidity deficit will borrow
the missing liquidity from the lending facility. There is thus an upper and a
lower bound for the interbank rate given by
iIBM = iLF − γ, (16)
iIBM = iDF + γ. (17)
These bounds for iIBM lead us to an upper threshold for γ. If γ exceeds
γ̄ :=
iLF − iDF
2
, (18)
the interbank market will break down. Transaction costs are prohibitively
high. Both the upper and the lower bound for the interbank rate will become
27The weight of the deficit costs is (1 − c)χ
∫ tmax
t
opt
b
tbg(tb) dtb, the weight of the surplus
revenues is −(1 − c)χ
∫ topt
b
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb. Note that
∫ tmax
t
opt
b
tbg(tb) dtb = E[tb|tb > t
opt
b ](1 −
G(tb)) and that −
∫ topt
b
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb = −E[tb|tb < t
opt
b ]G(tb), so that the weights reflect the
expected additional deficit/surplus and the respective occurrence probability. As E[tb] = 0,
we have −(1−c)χ
∫ topt
b
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb = (1−c)χ
∫ tmax
t
opt
b
tbg(tb) dtb, which means that the weight
with which possible deficit costs and surplus revenues enter the FOC is the same. Capturing
this identical weight by φ(t
opt
b ), the expected marginal uncertainty costs of granting loans
simplify to the last term in (13).
28Note that we will derive the interbank market equilibrium. However, we will not derive
a credit market equilibrium. Our focus is on the supply side of the credit market. We analyze
how far the costs and the availability of liquidity (and thus monetary policy in general, its
implementation in particular and the functioning of the interbank market) have an impact
on bank loan supply.
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binding. This implies that the set of possible equilibrium interbank rates I is
given by
I =
{
[iIBM , iIBM ] if γ ≤ γ̄,
{} if γ > γ̄. (19)
Denoting aggregate borrowing from the refinancing operations by RO, ag-
gregate loan supply to the non-banking sector by L, and (subgame perfect)
equilibrium variables by an asterisk, these considerations lead us to
Proposition 1 (a) If γ > γ̄, there will not be an active interbank market,
B∗ = 0.
(b) If γ ≤ γ̄, there will be an active interbank market at the second stage,
and the subgame perfect equilibrium interest rate iIBM∗ at the first stage will
be
iIBM∗ =

iIBM if RO∗ > cL∗,
ĩIBM ∈ I if RO∗ = cL∗,
iIBM if RO∗ < cL∗,
(20)
where ĩIBM is defined by (10).
Proof See appendix.
Using Figure 3, we illustrate in more detail the equilibrium interbank rate given
in Proposition 1. An interbank rate below iIBM implies that all banks facing a
liquidity deficit want to borrow their missing liquidity from the interbank mar-
ket. Consequently, if iIBM < iIBM , there will be a perfectly inelastic, strictly
positive demand for liquidity under all three possible liquidity conditions in
the banking sector presented in Figure 3. If iIBM > iIBM , all deficit banks
will prefer to borrow their liquidity from the central bank’s lending facility, i.e.
under all three possible liquidity conditions in the banking sector, interbank
demand for liquidity will equal zero. If iIBM = iIBM , banks are indifferent
whether to borrow from the interbank or the central bank’s lending facility,
i.e. interbank demand at this rate is perfectly elastic. Analogously, there will
be a perfectly inelastic, strictly positive supply of liquidity if iIBM > iIBM ,
interbank supply will equal zero if iIBM < iIBM , and interbank supply will
be perfectly elastic if iIBM = iIBM . Which equilibrium interbank rate will be
realised depends on the banking sector’s liquidity position.
An aggregate liquidity deficit will arise if the banking sector’s structural
liquidity needs cL∗ exceed the aggregate amount borrowed from the refinancing
operations RO∗. In this case, which is presented in Panel (a) of Figure 3,
for all iIBM < iIBM , there is an excess demand for liquidity, whereas for
all iIBM > iIBM there is an excess supply. The equilibrium interbank rate,
achieved through a process of tâtonnement,29 thus equals iIBM . To put it
differently, if there is an aggregate liquidity deficit, competition for scarce
liquidity will bring the interbank rate to its upper bound iIBM . At this upper
29For a formal analysis of this process see, for example, Andreu Mas-Colell and Michael
D. Whinston and Jerry R. Green (1995, chapter 17).
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bound, there is still a liquidity deficit in the banking sector so that the central
bank’s lending facility has to be used.
The case of an aggregate liquidity surplus in the banking sector is illus-
trated in Panel (b). Analogously to the deficit-case, competition for limited
lending possibilities in the interbank market will bring the interbank rate to
its lower bound iIBM . At this lower bound, there is still a liquidity surplus
in the banking sector, so that liquidity has to be placed in the central bank’s
deposit facility.
If there is neither an aggregate liquidity deficit nor surplus (RO∗ = cL∗),
see Panel (c), any rate within the interval [iIBM , iIBM ] can be consistent with
an equilibrium at the second stage of the model. However, at the first stage,
only ĩIBM , as given by (10), will be the subgame perfect equilibrium interest
rate for RO∗ = cL∗. For all other iIBM ∈ I, the expected marginal revenues
of borrowing from the refinancing operations strictly deviate from marginal
costs, inducing banks to borrow more or less than cL from the refinancing
operations, i.e. ĩIBM ∈ I will be the only subgame perfect equilibrium rate if
liquidity conditions are balanced (RO∗ = cL∗). As there is neither a liquidity
surplus nor deficit in the banking sector, none of the central bank’s facilities
is used.
0
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Fig. 3 Interbank Market Equilibrium
Proposition 1 leads us to a further threshold for γ:30
γ̄ := min
{
γ̄l :=
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
, γ̄u :=
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
}
≤ γ̄. (21)
If γ ≤ γ̄, we will have ĩIBM ∈ I, i.e., borrowing RO = cL will balance the
banks’ expected marginal revenues and the marginal costs of borrowing from
the refinancing operations. If γ̄ < γ ≤ γ̄, this will no longer be the case,
ĩIBM /∈ I. If γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, we will have ĩIBM < iIBM , and if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤
γ̄, we will have ĩIBM > iIBM . This means that if γ̄ < γ ≤ γ̄, there will be an
active interbank market, but for all iIBM ∈ I expected marginal revenues of
30One obtains γ̄l by setting in (10) ĩ
IBM = iIBM and solving that equation for γ.
Analogously, one obtains γ̄u by setting in (10) ĩIBM = iIBM .
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borrowing from the refinancing operations will deviate from marginal costs for
RO = cL. Banks will thus borrow more or less than cL from the refinancing
operations as we will show in the next section.
5.2 Borrowing from the Refinancing Operations and Bank Loan Supply
At the first stage, all banks face the same optimization problem, so that ROoptb ,
Loptb and, therefore, also t
opt
b are identical for all banks. As we have a continuum
of banks of unit mass, these bank-individual optimal values correspond to
the respective aggregate equilibrium variables L∗ and RO∗. Furthermore, we
can use t
opt
= t
∗
as the critical equilibrium bank transfer ratio is identical
for all banks. Depending on the level of interbank market transaction costs,
three different equilibria indexed by j = I, II, III are possible. The main
characteristics of these equilibria are:
– Equilibrium I: Low transaction costs, active interbank market, no precau-
tionary liquidity holdings.
– Equilibrium II: High transaction costs, active interbank market, precau-
tionary liquidity holdings.
– Equilibrium III: Prohibitively high transaction costs, inactive interbank
market, possible precautionary liquidity holdings.
In the following, we will have a closer look at each of them.
5.2.1 Equilibrium I: Low Transaction Costs
Proposition 2 If γ ≤ γ̄ banks will exclusively use the interbank market to
balance their liquidity position at the second stage, i.e.,
RO∗I = cL∗I , so that t
∗I
= RO
∗I−cL∗I
(1−c)χL∗I = 0 and i
IBM∗I = ĩIBM ∈ I.
Proof See appendix.
If interbank market transaction costs are sufficiently low (γ ≤ γ̄), borrowing
RO = cL will balance banks’ expected marginal revenues and the marginal
costs of borrowing from the refinancing operations. Borrowing more (less)
than cL from the refinancing operations would result in an aggregate liquidity
surplus (deficit) at the beginning of the second stage bringing the interbank
rate to its lower (upper) bound. This low (high) interbank rate would imply
that the expected marginal revenues of borrowing from the refinancing op-
erations would strictly deviate from marginal costs. Consequently, if γ ≤ γ̄,
RO∗I = cL∗I will be the only feasible equilibrium.
Note that for this result a possible asymmetry of the interest corridor or
of the distribution of t̃b does not play a role. The rates on the facilities are
irrelevant for the banks’ borrowing decision, as with γ ≤ γ̄ transaction costs are
so low that no bank expects to use the central bank’s facilities. With respect
to a possible asymmetric distribution of t̃b consider that rising transaction
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costs increase the costs of both, balancing a surplus and a deficit. However,
an asymmetric distribution of t̃b (G(0) 6= 0.5) means that for RO = cL banks
expect a deficit to be more or less probable so that rising transaction costs will
increase the expected costs of a deficit more or less than those of a surplus.
This should induce banks to hold positive or negative precautionary liquidity.
However, as long as γ ≤ γ̄, there will be a change in iIBM∗I = ĩIBM exactly
compensating the effect of an increase in γ on marginal surplus and deficit
costs, i.e., the price mechanism in the interbank market functions, so that
RO∗I = cL∗I remains the equilibrium solution. Formally, this can be seen by
having a closer look at Lemma 1. In case of an active interbank market, (8)
can be rewritten as
(iRO − iIBM∗j + γ)G(t∗j)
= (iIBM∗j + γ − iRO)
(
1−G(t∗j)
)
, with j = I, II. (22)
The LHS of (22) shows the expected marginal costs of a surplus, the RHS of
a deficit. In Equilibrium I, iIBM∗I = ĩIBM as given by (10) and t
∗I
= 0. An
increase in γ does not change either side as it is exactly compensated by a
respective decrease in iIBM∗I .
Lemma 3 reveals that interbank market transaction costs are a crucial
determinant of banks’ expected marginal uncertain liquidity costs of granting
loans. For γ ≤ γ̄, we have RO∗I = cL∗I , i.e. t∗I = 0, and all banks prefer to
use the interbank market instead of the facilities. Expected marginal uncertain
liquidity costs of granting loans thus simplify to
φ(0)2γ, where φ(0) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
0
tbg(tb) dtb. (23)
If interbank trading is not impaired (γ = 0), expected marginal uncertain liq-
uidity costs will be zero. Expected deficit costs and expected surplus revenues
will be the same, both will equal the interbank rate. However, positive trans-
action costs mean higher costs when borrowing from the interbank market and
lower revenues when lending to this market, i.e., they put a wedge between
the costs and revenues of trading in the interbank market, leading to positive
expected marginal uncertain liquidity costs.
5.2.2 Equilibrium II : High Transaction Costs
Proposition 3 (a) If γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, banks will hold positive precautionary
liquidity and will use the interbank market and the deposit facility to balance
their liquidity position at the second stage, i.e.,
RO∗II > cL∗II , so that t
∗II
= RO
∗II−cL∗II
(1−c)χL∗II > 0 and i
IBM∗II = iIBM .
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(b) If γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄, banks will hold negative precautionary liquidity and
will use the interbank market and the lending facility to balance their liquidity
position at the second stage, i.e.,31
RO∗II < cL∗II , so that t
∗II
= RO
∗II−cL∗II
(1−c)χL∗II < 0 and i
IBM∗II = iIBM .
If interbank market transaction costs are sufficiently high (γ > γ̄), possible
asymmetries of the interest corridor or of the distribution of t̃b will be rel-
evant for banks’ optimal borrowing from the refinancing operations. Due to
the asymmetries, banks expect a deficit to be more or less expensive than a
surplus for RO = cL, so that they hold precautionary liquidity.
If we have a symmetric distribution of t̃b (G(0) = 0.5) but an asymmetric
interest corridor in the form of iLF − iRO > iRO − iDF , an increase in γ be-
yond γ̄ = γ̄l will imply that at first only banks with a liquidity surplus will
no longer be willing to use the interbank market but will prefer the central
bank’s deposit facility, whereas for banks with a liquidity deficit, it will be still
more beneficial to use the interbank market. To maintain an active interbank
market, deficit banks thus accept having to also bear the transaction costs
of the surplus banks.32 Note that if γ exceeds γ̄, transaction costs will be so
high, that deficit banks will no longer be willing to bear double transaction
costs, but will prefer to use the central bank’s facilities. The interbank mar-
ket will break down (Equilibrium III). However, as long as we have an active
interbank market, due to the higher transaction cost burden, banks expect a
deficit to be more expensive than a surplus inducing them to hold positive
precautionary liquidity, RO∗II > cL∗II .33 Analogously, banks will hold nega-
tive precautionary liquidity (RO∗II < cL∗II) if iLF − iRO < iRO − iDF and if
γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄.
Let us turn next to the case of a symmetric interest corridor and an asym-
metric distribution of t̃b in the form ofG(0) < 0.5. The asymmetric distribution
means that for RO = cL banks expect a deficit to be more probable than a
surplus. As long as γ ≤ γ̄ = γ̄l, the resulting stronger impact of an increase
in γ on expected marginal deficit costs rather than on surplus costs will be
compensated by a respective decrease in ĩIBM (Equilibrium I). However, if
γ reaches γ̄l, further decreases in ĩ
IBM will no longer be possible, the price
mechanism in the interbank market will not function any longer as the lower
bound for iIBM will become binding. Then, further increases in γ mean that
31Note that if banks hold negative precautionary liquidity and if the non-negativity con-
straint on ROb binds, RO
∗II = 0 and t
∗II
= t = −c/(1− c)χ < 0 (see proof of Lemma 1 in
the appendix).
32In this case, balancing a liquidity deficit in the interbank market costs iIBM∗II + γ =
iIBM + γ = iDF + 2γ.
33If γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, ĩIBM < iIBM but I 6= {}. This means that if banks borrowed
RO = cL, for all iIBM ∈ I the expected marginal revenues of borrowing from the refinancing
operations would be higher than the expected marginal costs. Consequently, RO∗II > cL∗II .
Banks start to hold positive precautionary liquidity until the FOC for optimal borrowing
from the refinancing operations with an active interbank market (22) with iIBM∗II = iIBM
and t
∗II
> 0 is fulfilled.
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banks expect a deficit to be more expensive than a surplus so that they start
to hold positive precautionary liquidity, RO∗II > cL∗II .34 A similar story can
be told for G(0) > 0.5. Then, γ̄ = γ̄u, and if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄, banks will start
to hold negative precautionary liquidity, RO∗II < cL∗II .
In our discussion on monetary policy implementation in Section 6, the
FOCs for optimal holdings of precautionary liquidity play an important role.
Considering (12) and iIBM∗II being equal to iIBM , the FOC for optimal hold-
ings of positive precautionary liquidity becomes
(iRO − iDF )G(t∗II) = (iDF + 2γ − iRO)(1−G(t∗II)), with t∗II > 0. (24)
The expected marginal costs of holding positive precautionary liquidity in
the form of interest costs are given by the LHS of (24). The RHS shows the
expected marginal revenues in the form of avoided illiquidity costs.35 Analo-
gously, the FOC for holding optimal negative precautionary liquidity is given
by
(iRO − iLF + 2γ)G(t∗II) = (iLF − iRO)(1−G(t∗II)), with t∗II < 0. (25)
The expected marginal costs of holding negative precautionary liquidity in the
form of higher interest costs in case a deficit occurs, are presented by the RHS
of (25). The LHS shows expected marginal revenues in the form of avoided
surplus costs.36
It follows from Lemma 3 that for γ̄ < γ ≤ γ̄ the expected marginal uncer-
tainty costs of granting loans become
φ(t
∗II
)2γ where φ(t
∗
) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
t
∗II
tbg(tb) dtb. (26)
Again positive transaction costs put a wedge between the costs and revenues of
using the interbank market.37 Expected marginal uncertainty costs of granting
loans are thus positive and increase in γ. However, the more precautionary
liquidity banks hold, the lower the costs will be (see Section 4.3 for details).
34Formally, the same arguments as made in footnote 33 hold.
35Holding positive precautionary liquidity allows banks to finance a possible deficit at
the rate of iRO instead of iIBM∗II + γ = iDF + 2γ which is strictly larger than iRO for
γ > γ̄l.
36Surplus costs accrue because banks facing a liquidity surplus at the beginning of the
second stage, have borrowed this liquidity at the rate of iRO and receive iIBM∗II − γ =
iLF − 2γ < iRO for γ > γ̄u when lending it to the interbank market.
37If t
∗II
> 0, the interbank rate will be at its lower bound so that the marginal costs of
balancing a deficit are iDF + 2γ, whereas the marginal revenues of balancing a surplus are
iDF . If t
∗II
< 0, the interbank rate will be at its upper bound so that the marginal costs of
balancing a deficit are iLF , whereas marginal revenues of balancing a surplus are iLF − 2γ.
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5.2.3 Equilibrium III: Prohibitively High Transaction Costs
Proposition 4 If γ > γ̄, the interbank market will break down and banks only
use the central bank’s facilities to balance their liquidity position at the second
stage. Depending on the relative asymmetries of the distribution of t̃b and of
the interest corridor, banks may hold positive, negative or no precautionary
liquidity:38
RO∗III

> cL∗III ⇒ t∗III = RO
∗III−cL∗III
(1−c)χL∗III > 0 if G(0) <
iLF−iRO
iLF−iDF ,
= cL∗III ⇒ t∗III = RO
∗III−cL∗III
(1−c)χL∗III = 0 if G(0) =
iLF−iRO
iLF−iDF ,
< cL∗III ⇒ t∗III = RO
∗III−cL∗III
(1−c)χL∗III < 0 if G(0) >
iLF−iRO
iLF−iDF .
If γ > γ̄, interbank market transaction costs will be prohibitively high, so that
all banks will exclusively use the central bank’s facilities to balance their liq-
uidity position at the second stage. Whether they hold precautionary liquidity
depends again on the asymmetries of the distribution of t̃b and of the interest
corridor. According to (11), for RO = cL the expected marginal costs of a
deficit are (1−G(0))(iLF − iRO), of a surplus these costs are G(0)(iRO− iDF ).
Consequently, an asymmetric distribution (G(0) 6= 0.5) or an asymmetric in-
terest corridor (iLF − iRO 6= iRO − iDF ) result in a deficit or a surplus that is
more expensive, so that banks hold precautionary liquidity.
Referring to (12) the FOC for holding precautionary liquidity in this equi-
librium reads(
iRO − iDF
)
G
(
t
∗III
)
=
(
iLF − iRO
) (
1−G
(
t
∗III
))
with t
∗III
R 0. (27)
If banks hold positive precautionary liquidity (t
∗III
> 0), the LHS of (27)
presents the expected marginal costs of holding this liquidity in the form of
interest costs. The RHS shows the expected marginal revenues in the form
of avoided illiquidity costs. If banks hold negative precautionary liquidity
(t
∗III
< 0), the LHS will present the expected marginal revenues (avoided
surplus costs), whereas the RHS will show the expected marginal costs (inter-
est costs).
Referring to Lemma 3, if the interbank market breaks down, the expected
marginal uncertainty costs of granting loans will be given by
φ(t
∗III
)(iLF − iDF ), where φ(t∗III) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
t
∗III
tbg(tb) dtb. (28)
These costs increase in the width of the interest corridor, and this increase
will be less pronounced the more precautionary liquidity banks hold.
38Note again that if banks hold negative precautionary liquidity and if the negativity-
constraint on ROb binds, RO
∗III = 0 and t
∗III
= t = −c/(1−c)χ < 0 (see proof of Lemma
1 in the appendix).
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6 Monetary Policy and Bank Loan Supply
With respect to the influence of monetary policy on bank loan supply, the
banks’ expected marginal liquidity costs of granting loans play a crucial role. In
the following, we will first analyze how interbank market transaction costs and
banks’ uncertainty about their idiosyncratic liquidity needs affect bank loan
supply. Then, we will examine the impact of different monetary policy impulses
on bank loan supply, explicitly pointing to the importance of interbank market
transaction costs and of banks’ uncertainty over their idiosyncratic liquidity
needs.
6.1 Frictions and Uncertainty
Result 1 In the three possible equilibria I, II, and III, the effect of a change
in interbank market transaction costs on bank loan supply is
∂L∗I
∂γ
=
−2φ(0)
λ
< 0,
∂L∗II
∂γ
=
−
2φ(t
∗II
)
λ +
2(1−c)χt∗II(1−G(t∗II))
λ if t
∗II
> 0
− 2φ(t
∗II
)
λ −
2(1−c)χt∗IIG(t∗II)
λ if t
∗II
< 0
 < 0,
∂L∗III
∂γ
= 0.
Proof See appendix.
Result 1 shows that in Equilibria I and II, increasing interbank market
transaction costs have a contractionary effect on bank loan supply. In both
equilibria, banks expect to use the interbank market to balance uncertain liq-
uidity needs, so that higher transaction costs increase the expected marginal
uncertainty costs of granting loans. Holdings of precautionary liquidity reduce
the expected marginal uncertainty costs (see (15)). As higher interbank mar-
ket transaction costs induce banks to hold more precautionary liquidity (in
absolute terms),39 in Equilibrium II, the contractionary effect is weakened, as
is formally shown by the second term of ∂L∗II/∂γ.40 In Equilibrium III, the
interbank market is not (expected to be) used, so that γ has no influence on
bank loan supply.
39Formally, this is revealed by the FOCs (24) and (25).
40If the non-negativity constraint on ROb binds, banks cannot increase their negative
precautionary liquidity holdings. In this case, the described weakening effect in Equilibrium
II is omitted. Furthermore, φ(t
∗II
) = φ(t) with t = −c/(1− c)χ < 0 (see proof of Lemma 1
in the appendix).
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Result 2 In the three possible equilibria I, II, and III, the effect of a change
in the extent of uncertainty on bank loan supply is
∂L∗I
∂χ
=
−φ(0)2γ
λχ
< 0,
∂L∗II
∂χ
=
−φ(t∗II)2γ
λχ
< 0,
∂L∗III
∂χ
=
−φ(t∗III)
(
iLF − iDF
)
λχ
< 0.
Proof See appendix.
Result 2 reveals that in all equilibria, an increase in the extent of uncer-
tainty leads to a decrease in bank loan supply. Higher uncertainty, here in the
form of a higher dispersion of χt̃b, means that banks expect a larger deficit as
well as a larger surplus. Consequently, the expected marginal uncertainty costs
increase and banks reduce their loan supply. In Equilibria II and III, this effect
is mitigated as the increase in χ implies that banks hold more precautionary
liquidity, which has a negative effect on expected marginal uncertainty costs
(see (15)).41
6.2 Equal Change in All Central Bank Interest Rates
Starting our analysis of the impact of different monetary policy impulses on
bank loan supply with an equal change in all central bank’s interest rates, we
get
Result 3 If di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1, we obtain
∂L∗j
∂iRO
= − c
λ
< 0 and
∂2L∗j
∂iRO∂χ
=
∂2L∗j
∂iRO∂γ
= 0 ∀ j.
Proof See appendix.
An equal decrease in all central bank interest rates has the same expan-
sionary effect on bank loan supply in all equilibria j = I, II, III. The crucial
point is that this monetary policy impulse only leads to a change in certain
41If the non-negativity constraint on ROb binds, banks will not be able to increase their
holdings of negative precautionary liquidity. The effect of an increase in χ on L∗II and L∗III
will thus be stronger. Formally, we have
∂L∗II
∂χ
=
−φ(t)2γ
λχ
+
2γtg(t)c
λχ
< 0,
∂L∗III
∂χ
=
−φ(t)
(
iLF − iDF
)
λχ
+
(
iLF − iDF
)
tg(t)c
λχ
< 0,
with t = −c/(1− c)χ < 0 (see proof of Lemma 1 in the appendix).
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marginal liquidity costs, whereas the expected marginal uncertainty costs of
granting loans remain unchanged. It follows from (23), (26), and (28) that this
monetary policy impulse would only have an impact on these costs if banks
changed their holdings of precautionary liquidity, i.e., if t
∗
changed. However,
an equal change in all interest rates has no impact on the marginal costs and
revenues of holding precautionary liquidity, as revealed by the FOCs (24),
(25), and (27). As γ and χ are only relevant for expected marginal uncertainty
costs of granting loans, neither the interbank market friction in the form of
transaction costs nor the uncertainty about idiosyncratic liquidity needs has
an impact on the effectiveness of this monetary policy impulse on bank loan
supply.
6.3 Change in the Width of the Interest Corridor
As an alternative to an equal change in all central bank interest rates, the
central bank may change the width of the interest corridor around its policy
rate. This leads us to
Result 4 If di
DF
diLF
= −1, we obtain
∂L∗I
∂iLF
= 0,
∂L∗II
∂iLF
= −
(1− c)χ|t∗II |
λ
< 0,
∂L∗III
∂iLF
= −
2φ(t
∗III
)
λ
< 0,
∂2L∗I
∂iLF ∂χ
= 0,
∂2L∗II
∂iLF ∂χ
= −
(1− c)|t∗II |
λ
< 0,
∂2L∗III
∂iLF ∂χ
= −
2φ(t
∗III
)
λχ
< 0,
∂2L∗I
∂iLF ∂γ
= 0,
∂2L∗II
∂iLF ∂γ
=

− (1−c)χ(1−G(t
∗II ))
λγg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0
− (1−c)χG(t
∗II )
λγg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0
 < 0, ∂
2L∗III
∂iLF ∂γ
= 0.
Proof See appendix.
In our model, the symmetry/asymmetry of the corridor refers to the refi-
nancing rate iRO. The corridor will be symmetric (asymmetric) if this rate is
(not) the mid-point of the corridor.42 By changing the width of a symmetric
interest corridor, the central bank may influence bank loan supply without
changing its policy rate iRO. As iRO remains unchanged, certain marginal liq-
uidity costs of granting loans do not alter. A potential effect of this monetary
policy impulse on bank loan supply must thus be due to a change in expected
marginal uncertainty costs. In Equilibrium I, banks never use the facilities to
balance their uncertain liquidity needs. Changing the width of the corridor
has therefore no effect on their loan supply decision. However, in Equilibria II
and III, banks expect to use at least one of the facilities. In these equilibria
widening the interest corridor has a contractionary effect on bank loan supply.
42In the literature, the symmetry/asymmetry of the interest corridor also refers to the
central bank’s target interbank rate (Bindseil, 2014, chapters 4 and 13). With persisting
high levels of excess liquidity the target rate is the deposit facility rate and, independent of
the position of the refinancing rate, the interest corridor is considered to be asymmetric.
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In Equilibrium II, an increase in the corridor width leads to higher marginal
costs of holding positive as well as negative precautionary liquidity, see FOCs
(24) and (25), so that banks reduce their holdings of this liquidity. This in-
creases the expected marginal uncertainty costs of granting loans, and banks
reduce their loan supply.43 Due to the reduced holdings of precautionary liq-
uidity banks expect to use the interbank market more intensively. An increase
in γ hence amplifies the contractionary effect of a corridor widening on bank
loan supply. Furthermore, the reduced holdings of precautionary liquidity are
more significant, the higher the extent of uncertainty is, so that the effect of
this monetary policy impulse on bank loan supply increases in χ.
In Equilibrium III, banks do not adjust their precautionary liquidity hold-
ings relative to their loan supply, i.e., t
∗III
remains unchanged, as the sym-
metry of the interest corridor implies for all possible facility rates G(t
∗
) =
1 − G(t∗) = 0.5. Only in this case, the expected marginal costs equal the
expected marginal revenues of holding precautionary liquidity, see FOC (27).
Consequently, if the corridor is widened, the expected marginal uncertainty
costs of granting loans will change only because of the marginal uncertainty
costs (iLF − iDF ) will increase. As the expected deficit and the expected sur-
plus increase in the extent of uncertainty, the weight of these costs φ(t
∗III
)
becomes larger, so that the impact of this monetary policy impulse on bank
loan supply also increases in the extent of uncertainty.
6.4 Change in the Asymmetry of the Interest Corridor
There are several ways to implement an asymmetric interest corridor or to
change an already existing asymmetry of the corridor. Here, we take a closer
look at the consequences of a sole change in the deposit rate iDF . Building
on this analysis, we will draw some general conclusions with respect to the
consequences of a change in the asymmetry of the interest corridor on bank
loan supply at the end of this section. Changing only iDF leads to
43If the non-negativity constraint on ROb binds, banks will not be able to change their
holdings of negative precautionary liquidity. The monetary policy impulse will have no effect
on bank loan supply.
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Result 5 Changing only the deposit rate iDF (diRO = diLF = 0), we obtain
∂L∗I
∂iDF
= 0,
∂L∗II
∂iDF
=
{
(1−c)χt∗II
λ
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0
0 if t
∗II
< 0
,
∂L∗III
∂iDF
=
φ(t∗III )
λ
+
(1−c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III )
λ
> 0,
∂2L∗I
∂iDF ∂χ
= 0,
∂2L∗II
∂iDF ∂χ
{
=
(1−c)t∗II
λ
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0
= 0 if t
∗II
< 0
,
∂2L∗III
∂iDF ∂χ
=
φ(t∗III )
λχ
+
(1−c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III )
λχ
> 0,
∂2L∗I
∂iDF ∂γ
= 0,
∂2L∗II
∂iDF ∂γ
= (1−c)χG(t
∗II )
λγg(t∗II )
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0
= 0 if t
∗II
< 0
,
∂2L∗III
∂iDF ∂γ
= 0.
Proof See appendix.
A decrease in iDF has either no or a contractionary effect on bank loan
supply. In Equilibrium I and in Equilibrium II for t̄∗II < 0, banks do not
(expect to) use the deposit facility. A change in iDF therefore has no effect on
bank loan supply.
If banks hold positive precautionary liquidity in Equilibrium II (t̄∗II > 0),
a decrease in iDF will have a contractionary effect on bank loan supply. As
holding positive precautionary liquidity will become more expensive, see FOC
(24), banks will reduce their holdings of this liquidity. The expected marginal
uncertainty costs of granting loans will increase, and banks will reduce their
loan supply. Analogous to the monetary policy impulse of a widening of the
interest corridor, this policy impulse is more pronounced the higher the inter-
bank market transaction costs and the extent of uncertainty are.
In Equilibrium III, a decrease in iDF has a contractionary effect on bank
loan supply. The driving force is the increase in the marginal uncertainty costs
of granting loans (iLF − iDF ). This direct effect is reflected by the first term of
∂L∗III/∂iDF . If banks hold positive precautionary liquidity (t̄∗ > 0), this con-
tractionary effect will be reinforced. The decrease in iDF increases the expected
marginal costs of holding positive precautionary liquidity, so that banks will
reduce their holdings of this liquidity. The resulting increase in the expected
marginal uncertainty costs has a contractionary effect on bank loan supply (see
second term of ∂LIII∗/∂iDF ). If banks hold negative precautionary liquidity
(t̄∗ < 0) or no precautionary liquidity (t̄∗ = 0), the contractionary effect will
be weakened as the expected marginal revenues of holding this liquidity will
become higher so that banks will increase or start to hold negative precau-
tionary liquidity which would have a negative effect on the expected marginal
30 Monika Bucher et al.
uncertainty costs of granting loans.44 The direct effect of this monetary policy
impulse on the expected marginal uncertainty costs (increase in iLF − iDF ) is
stronger than the indirect effect (change in holdings of precautionary liquid-
ity). As marginal uncertainty costs are more important to banks the higher
the extent of uncertainty is (formally, φ(t
∗
) increases in χ), the effect of this
policy impulse is more pronounced the higher the extent of uncertainty is.
From this analysis we can conclude the following general results with re-
spect to the effect of a change in the asymmetry of the interest corridor on
bank loan supply. In Equilibrium I, changes in the asymmetry of the corridor
do not have an impact on bank loan supply. In Equilibrium II, changes in the
asymmetry of the corridor resulting in an increase in the costs of holding pre-
cautionary liquidity have a negative effect on bank loan supply. In Equilibrium
III, those changes in the asymmetry of the corridor which leads to an increase
in the spread between iLF and iDF have a negative effect on bank loan supply.
Precautionary holdings of liquidity reinforce or dampen this effect.
6.5 Collateralization and Minimum Reserve Requirements
In our model, we have neglected two main elements of the ECB’s operational
framework: the collateralization of central bank credits and the minimum re-
serve requirements. Considering these elements is not crucial for our analysis
as they only change our results quantitatively.
If we took the collateralization of central bank credits into consideration,
banks would face opportunity costs of holding collateral. As a result, the ex-
pected marginal liquidity costs would increase.45 Bank loan supply would be
lower but our model results would not change qualitatively.
Reserve requirements lead to a structural liquidity deficit of the banking
sector. In our model, such a deficit is already captured by considering cash
withdrawals. Introducing reserve requirements would therefore simply increase
the existing structural deficit. A main feature of the Eurosystem’s minimum
reserve system is that banks can make use of the averaging provision of required
reserves during the reserve maintenance period. This allows banks to smooth
out liquidity fluctuations. In our model, the marginal uncertainty costs of
granting loans would decrease. Although this would have a positive effect on
bank loan supply, the qualitative results of our model would not change.
44This weakening effect will not exist if the non-negativity constraint on ROb is bind-
ing, as then, banks would not be able to increase their negative holdings of precaution-
ary liquidity any further. Formally, we have in this case ∂L∗III/∂iDF = φ(t)/λ > 0 and
∂2L∗III/∂iDF ∂χ = (φ(t)− tg(t)c)/λχ > 0, with t = −c/((1−c)χ) < 0 (see proof of Lemma
1 in the appendix).
45For a respective analysis see, for example, Neyer and Wiemers (2004) and Berentsen
and Monnet (2008).
Interbank Market Friction-Induced Holdings of Precautionary Liquidity 31
7 Conclusion
The interbank market plays a crucial role for monetary policy implementation
as it serves as the starting point of the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism. Based on a theoretical model, this paper analyzes how far interbank
market frictions in the form of broadly defined transaction costs may impede
the transmission mechanism. We find that interbank market frictions have a
negative impact on bank loan supply but that they are not an impediment for
the monetary transmission mechanism. The central bank can still influence
commercial banks’ expected liquidity costs and thus their loan supply. First,
the central bank’s standing facilities offer an alternative to using the friction-
burdened and thus costly interbank market. Second, and this is a main result
of our paper, the rates on the facilities determine the costs of friction-induced
holdings of precautionary liquidity. Increasing the rate on the deposit facility
and decreasing the rate on the lending facility are expansionary monetary pol-
icy measures. Note that the sign of the central bank’s interest rates does not
play a role for this result.
Our model allows us to draw some conclusions for bank loan supply in the
euro area and the ECB’s monetary policy. During the financial crisis, interbank
market frictions became stronger which made interbank trading more expen-
sive. Furthermore, bank idiosyncratic liquidity risk increased. Both led to a
rise in banks’ expected liquidity costs which had a negative impact on bank
loan supply. However, from October 2008, when the collapse of the investment
bank Lehman Brothers marked a peak of the global financial crisis, up to now
(October 2018) the ECB has not only decreased its main refinancing rate from
4,75% to a historically low level of 0%, but it has also narrowed the interest
corridor of its standing facilities from 200 basis points to 65 basis points. Thus,
the ECB has not only significantly reduced banks’ expected liquidity costs by
lowering the price for liquidity borrowed directly from the central bank, but
in addition, it has reduced interbank market friction-induced liquidity costs.
Consequently, monetary policy has not only been extremely expansive, but it
has also made sure that interbank market frictions have not been a signifi-
cant impediment for its pass-through to bank loan supply. Nevertheless, bank
lending in the euro area, especially in the periphery, has been relatively weak.
This indicates that there have been structural problems, such as insufficient
bank capital or the lack of competitive projects in need of financing.
Finally, it should be noted that in our model, the banking sector as a whole
faces a structural liquidity deficit forcing banks to borrow liquidity from the
central bank. As the central bank totally satisfies banks’ demand for liquidity,
excess liquidity holdings are purely demand-driven. However, the strongly in-
creasing aggregate excess liquidity holdings, which can be observed in the euro
area since 2015, are mainly due to the Eurosystem’s large-scale asset purchases
under its Expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP) and are thus mainly
supply-driven (see Baldo et al, 2017). These asset purchases even implied that
since August 2015 the banking sector as a whole has faced a structural liquidity
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surplus.46 However, despite this surplus there still have been banks borrowing
liquidity from the Eurosystem. A deep analysis of commercial banks’ liquidity
management and the consequences for bank loan supply and monetary pol-
icy implementation in an environment of a structural liquidity surplus and
a heterogeneous banking sector thus presents an interesting issue for future
research.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
It has to be shown that if the non-negativity constraint on ROb does not bind, optimal
borrowing from the central bank’s refinancing operation will be described by (8). It follows
from (3) to (5), that the first stage optimization problem of bank b reads:
max
Lb∈R
+
0
,ROb∈R
+
0
f(Lb,ROb) = i
LLb − 12λL
2
b − i
ROROb
−max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}∫ tb
tmin
Nbg(tb) dtb
−min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}∫ tmax
tb
Nbg(tb) dtb,
(29)
with Nb given by (6) and tb by (7).
By applying Leibniz’s rule and making use of the fact that Nb = 0 for tb = tb, we obtain:
f ′ROb (Lb,Rb) = −i
RO −max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}∫ tb
tmin
∂Nb
∂ROb
g(tb)dtb
−min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}∫ tmax
tb
∂Nb
∂ROb
g(tb)dtb.
(30)
We can infer from (6) that ∂Nb
∂ROb
= −1. Insertion of this in (30) and rewriting terms yields
f ′ROb (Lb,Rb) = −i
RO + max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}
G
(
tb
)
+ min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
} [
1−G
(
tb
)]
.
(31)
Note that f ′ROb
(Lb,Rb) decreases in G
(
tb
)
∈ [0, 1], which in turn (weakly) increases in tb.
Moreover, we know from (7) that
– tb increases in ROb, so that f
′
ROb
(Lb,Rb) (weakly) decreases in ROb,
– and from the restriction ROb ≥ 0 that tb is restricted to tb ≥ − c(1−c)χ =: t.
Denoting optima by the superscript opt, we can distinguish three cases:
1. If iIBM > iRO + γ, then f ′ROb
(Lb,Rb) > 0 for all ROb < ∞. Therefore, we obtain
ROoptb →∞.
46Note that since the beginning of the ECB’s full allotment policy in 2008, the banking
sector operates in an environment of excess liquidity. However, the difference between the
period until August 2015 and the period thereafter is that since August 2015, the banking
sector has no longer been able to reduce excess liquidity by decreasing its borrowing from
the ECB. Even if no bank borrows from the ECB, there will be excess liquidity.
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2. If iIBM ∈
[
iRO − γ, iRO + γ
]
, the first order conditions for optimal borrowing from the
refinancing operations are
f ′ROb (L
opt
b ,R
opt
b ) ≤ 0, f
′
ROb
(Loptb ,R
opt
b ) ·RO
opt
b = 0, RO
opt
b ≥ 0. (32)
Accordingly, if the non-negativity constraint for ROb does not bind, marginal costs
and expected marginal revenues of borrowing from the refinancing operations will be
balanced, f ′ROb
(Loptb ,R
opt
b ) = 0.
However, if for ROb = 0, i.e. for tb = t, expected marginal revenues are strictly lower
than marginal costs, the non-negativity constraint becomes binding, further decreases
in ROb are not possible. Then, RO
opt
b = 0 and f
′
ROb
(Loptb ,R
opt
b ) < 0.
3. If iIBM < iRO − γ, then f ′ROb (Lb,Rb) < 0 for all ROb ≥ 0. The non-negativity
constraint on ROb binds, so that RO
opt
b = 0.
An interbank rate iIBM 6∈
[
iRO − γ, iRO + γ
]
is not a possible equilibrium rate: Such an
interbank rate would imply that ROoptb = 0 or RO
opt
b →∞, respectively. At the first stage,
all banks are identical, i.e. they solve the same optimization problem and ROoptb is the same
for all banks. Therefore, ROoptb = 0 or RO
opt
b →∞ would imply that also at the aggregate
level borrowing from the refinancing operations would be zero or infinite so that aggregate
supply or demand in the interbank market at the second stage would be zero, so that there
would not be an active interbank market. Accordingly, the cases 1 and 3 cannot occur
in equilibrium. For the sake of a clearer presentation we thus exclude these non-relevant
cases already at this stage. In the remaining case 2, optimal borrowing from the refinancing
operations requires f ′ROb
(Loptb ,R
opt
b ) = 0 if the non-negativity constraint for ROb does
not bind. Setting thus (31) equal to zero and solving for iRO gives (8). Consequently, we
have shown that if the non-negativity constraint for ROb does not bind, a bank’s optimal
borrowing from the refinancing operations will be described by (8). 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
It has to be shown that if the non-negativity constraint on ROb does not bind, optimal loan
supply to the non-banking sector will be described by (13). The respective optimization
problem of bank b is given by (29). By applying Leibniz’s rule on (29) and making use of
the property that Nb = 0 for tb = tb, we obtain:
f ′Lb (Lb,Rb) = i
L − λLb −max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}∫ tb
tmin
∂Nb
∂Lb
g(tb)dtb
−min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}∫ tmax
tb
∂Nb
∂Lb
g(tb)dtb.
(33)
We can infer from (6) that ∂Nb
∂Lb
= c + (1− c)χtb. Insertion of this in (33) and rewriting
terms yields
f ′Lb (Lb,Rb) = i
L − λLb
− c
[
max
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}
G
(
tb
)
+ min
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
} [
1−G
(
tb
)]]
− (1− c)χmax
{
iIBM − γ, iDF
}∫ tb
tmin
tbg(tb)dtb
− (1− c)χmin
{
iIBM + γ, iLF
}∫ tmax
tb
tbg(tb)dtb.
(34)
Using the result for optimal borrowing from the refinancing operations given by (8), we can
replace the term in square brackets in the second row of (34) by iRO. Due to E[tb] = 0
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we have −
∫ tb
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb =
∫ tmax
tb
tbg(tb) dtb. This allows us to replace −
∫ tb
tmin
tbg(tb)dtb
by
∫ tmax
t
opt
b
tbg(tb) dtb in (34). Setting then (34) equal to zero and solving for i
L gives (13).
Consequently, we have shown that if the non-negativity constraint for ROb does not bind
(we have made use of (8) which will only hold if this restriction does not bind), a bank’s
optimal lending to the non-banking sector will be described by (13). 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
(a) It has to be shown that if γ > γ̄, we will have an inactive interbank market, i. e. B∗ = 0.
If iIBM + γ > iLF , no bank will borrow from the interbank market as borrowing from the
lending facility is less costly, i.e. B = 0. If iIBM−γ < iDF , no bank will lend to the interbank
market as using the deposit facility earns a higher revenue, i.e. B = 0. Consequently, there
is an upper and a lower bound for iIBM :
iIBM = iLF − γ, iIBM = iDF + γ. (35)
If iIBM < iIBM , there is no iIBM at which both market sides are willing to transact, i.e.
I = {} (I is defined by (19)). This will be the case if γ > γ̄:
iIBM = iLF − γ < iIBM = iDF + γ (36)
⇒ γ >
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄. (37)
Consequently, if γ > γ̄, B∗ = 0. However, for γ ≤ γ̄, I 6= {}, there will an active interbank
market.
(b) It has to be shown that if γ ≤ γ̄,
iIBM∗ =

iIBM if RO∗ > cL∗,
ĩIBM ∈ I if RO∗ = cL∗,
iIBM if RO∗ < cL∗.
(38)
If γ ≤ γ̄, we have an active interbank market, and (38) presents the equilibrium interbank
rate for the different possible liquidity scenarios. The first and third line of (38) are trivial.
Liquidity excess, RO∗ > cL∗, (shortage, RO∗ < cL∗) will bring iIBM∗ to its lower (upper)
bound. If liquidity conditions are balanced (RO∗ = cL∗), iIBM∗ = ĩIBM will be the only
subgame perfect equilibrium interest rate: Having an active interbank market, the FOC for
borrowing RO = cL from the refinancing operations in the first stage given in Lemma 1
becomes
(iIBM∗ − γ)G(0) + (iIBM∗ + γ)(1−G(0)) = iRO. (39)
Solving (39) for iIBM∗ results in ĩIBM as given in (10). Consequently, when borrowing
RO = cL, ĩIBM is the only interbank rate at which (39) is fulfilled, at which expected
marginal revenues and marginal costs are balanced. For all other iIBM expected marginal
revenues will strictly deviate from marginal costs, inducing banks to borrow more or less
than cL. Consequently, for RO∗ = cL∗, ĩIBM is the only subgame perfect equilibrium
interbank rate. 
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
It has to be shown that if γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ = cL∗ and iIBM∗ = ĩIBM , with γ̄ defined in (21)
and ĩIBM in (10). As γ̄ ≤ γ̄ (see proof of Proposition 3), γ ≤ γ̄ implies that we have an
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active interbank market (see Proposition 1). Having an active interbank market, the FOC
for optimal borrowing from the refinancing operations given in Lemma 1 becomes
(iIBM∗ − γ)G
(
t
)
+ (iIBM∗ + γ)
(
1−G
(
t
))
= iRO. (40)
When borrowing RO = cL, t̄ = 0 (see (7)), i.e. G(t̄) equals G(0), and the interbank rate
which fulfills (40) equals ĩIBM . To have ĩIBM = iIBM∗, ĩIBM must be ∈ I = [iIBM , iIBM ]
(see (19)). If γ ≤ γ̄, this will be the case:
For ĩIBM ≥ iIBM , we must have
iIBM = iDF + γ ≤ ĩIBM = iRO − γ(1− 2G(0)),⇒
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
≥ γ, ⇒ γ̄l ≥ γ. (41)
As we only look at γ < γ̄, and γ̄ := min {γ̄l, γ̄u} (see (21)), ĩIBM ≥ iIBM .
For ĩIBM ≤ iIBM , we must have
iIBM = iLF − γ ≥ ĩIBM = iRO − γ(1− 2G(0)),⇒
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
≥ γ, ⇒ γ̄u ≥ γ. (42)
As we only look at γ < γ̄, and γ̄ := min {γ̄l, γ̄u} (see (21)), ĩIBM ≤ iIBM . As conditions
(41) and (42) are fulfilled, ĩIBM ∈ I. Consequently, RO∗ = cL∗ and iIBM∗ = ĩIBM is an
equilibrium.
When borrowing RO > cL, iIBM = iIBM , see Proposition 1. Inserting iIBM = iDF +γ
(see (17)) into (40) and solving for γ, we get that the FOC is only fulfilled for
γ =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(t̄))
. (43)
However, with RO > cL, t̄ > 0 (see (7)), i.e. G(t̄) > G(0), so that
γ =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(t̄))
>
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
= γ̄l. (44)
As γ̄l ≥ γ̄ (see (21)), RO > cL cannot be an equilibrium if γ ≤ γ̄.
When borrowing RO < cL, iIBM = iIBM , see Proposition 1. Inserting iIBM = iLF −γ
(see (16)) into (40) and solving for γ, we get that the FOC is only fulfilled for
γ =
iLF − iRO
2G(t̄)
. (45)
However, with RO < cL, t̄ < 0 (see (7)), i.e. G(t̄) < G(0), so that
γ =
iLF − iRO
2G(t̄)
>
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
= γ̄u. (46)
As γ̄u ≥ γ̄ (see (21)), RO < cL cannot be an equilibrium if γ ≤ γ̄.
Consequently, we have shown that if γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ = cL∗ and iIBM∗ = ĩIBM will be the
only possible equilibrium. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
(a) It has to be shown that if γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ > cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM . It is helpful
to have a closer look at the relation between γ̄, γ̄l, γ̄u, and γ̄ first. γ̄, γ̄l, and γ̄u are defined in
(21), γ̄ in (18). Note that we assume throughout the paper that either the interest corridor
or the distribution of t̃ is asymmetric or that both are symmetric.
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a1. If γ̄ = γ̄l = γ̄u, we will have a symmetric interest corridor and a symmetric distribution
of t̃:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
=
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
= γ̄u (47)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iRO
=
1−G(0)
G(0)
. (48)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (48) will be equal to 1. Equality
of both sides of the equation requires that also the RHS must be equal to 1, which will
only be the case if there is a symmetric distribution of t̃. Consequently, γ̄l = γ̄u implies
that we have a symmetric interest corridor and a symmetric distribution of t̃.
a2. If γ̄ = γ̄l = γ̄u, we have that γ̄ = γ̄:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
=
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄ (49)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iDF
= 1−G(0). (50)
A symmetric interest corridor implies that the LHS of (50) is equal to 0.5. Equality
then requires, that also the RHS must equal 0.5. This will only be the case if we have a
symmetric distribution of t̃. Consequently, a symmetric interest corridor and a symmetric
distribution of t̃ imply that γ̄l = γ̄. As argued in point a1 in this proof, these symmetries
also imply that γ̄ = γ̄l = γ̄u. Consequently, for the symmetric case, we have γ̄ = γ̄l =
γ̄u = γ̄.
a3. If γ̄ = γ̄l < γ̄, we will have that γ̄l < γ̄u, i.e. we will have an asymmetric interest
corridor or an asymmetric distribution of t̃:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
<
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
= γ̄u (51)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iRO
<
1−G(0)
G(0)
. (52)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (52) will be equal to 1. Then (52)
requires the RHS to be larger than 1, so that there must be an asymmetric distribution
of t̃. If there is a symmetric distribution of t̃, the RHS (52) will equal 1. In this case,
the LHS must be smaller than 1, i.e. there must be an asymmetric interest corridor.
Consequently, γ̄ = γ̄l < γ̄ implies that we have either an asymmetric interest corridor
or an asymmetric distribution of t̃.
a4. Furthermore, γ̄l < γ̄u implies that γ̄l < γ̄:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
<
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄ (53)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iDF
< 1−G(0). (54)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (54) will equal 0.5, i.e. for γ̄l to
be smaller than γ̄, 1 − G(0) must be larger than 0.5. Considering the argument given
in point a3 in this proof, we can show that this is the case for γ̄l < γ̄u: A symmetric
interest corridor implies that the LHS of (52) equals 1, which requires the RHS of (52)
to be larger than 1, which means that (1−G(0)) > 0.5. Consequently, (54) is fulfilled,
so that γ̄l < γ̄ if γ̄l < γ̄u. If there is a symmetric distribution of t̃, the RHS of (54) will
be 0.5, i.e. for γ̄l to be smaller than γ̄, (i
RO − iDF )/(iLF − iDF ) must be smaller than
0.5. Considering the argument given in point a3 in this proof, we can show that this is
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the case for γ̄l < γ̄u: A symmetric distribution of t̃ implies that the RHS of (52) equals
1, which requires
iRO − iDF < iLF − iRO (55)
⇒ iRO − iDF + iRO − iDF < iLF − iRO + iRO − iDF (56)
⇒ 2(iRO − iDF ) < iLF − iDF (57)
⇒ (iRO − iDF )/(iLF − iDF ) < 0.5 (58)
so that (54) is also fulfilled for a symmetric distribution of t̃.
a5. Furthermore, γ̄l < γ̄u implies that γ̄u > γ̄:
γ̄u =
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
>
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄ (59)
⇒
iLF − iRO
iLF − iDF
> G(0). (60)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (60) will be 0.5. i.e. for γ̄u to be
larger than γ̄, G(0) must be smaller than 0.5. This is the case for γ̄l < γ̄u (see point
a3 in this proof): A symmetric interest corridor implies that the LHS of (52) equals 1,
i.e. (1 − G(0)) > G(0) which means that G(0) < 0.5. Consequently, (60) is fulfilled, so
that γ̄u > γ̄ if γ̄l < γ̄u. If there is a symmetric distribution of t̃, the RHS of (60) will
be 0.5, i.e. for γ̄u to be smaller than γ̄, (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ) must be larger than
0.5. Considering the argument given in point a3 in this proof, we can show that this is
the case for γ̄l < γ̄u: A symmetric distribution of t̃ implies that the RHS of (52) equals
1, which requires
iRO − iDF < iLF − iRO (61)
⇒ iRO − iDF + iLF − iLF < iLF − iRO (62)
⇒ iLF − iDF < iLF + iLF − iRO − iRO (63)
⇒ iLF − iDF < 2(iLF − iRO) (64)
⇒ 0.5 < (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ) (65)
so that (60) is also fulfilled for a symmetric distribution.
Having clarified the relation between the different γ, we are now in a position to prove
that RO∗ > cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM if γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄. As γ ≤ γ̄, we have an active
interbank market (see Proposition 1). Consequently, the FOC for optimal borrowing from
the refinancing operations is given by (40).
When borrowing RO = cL, G(t̄) equal G(0), and the interbank rate, which fulfills (40),
is ĩIBM , see proof of Proposition 1. However, as revealed by (41), for γ > γ̄l, ĩ
IBM /∈ I, i.e.
for γ > γ̄l, RO = cL cannot be an equilibrium.
When borrowing RO > cL, iIBM = iIBM = iDF + γ, see Proposition 1 and (17).
Inserting iIBM into (40), we get that borrowing RO > cL is optimal for those γ given by
(43). These γ are strictly larger than γ̄l, as (44) reveals. As γ̄l < γ̄ (see point a4 in this
proof), for γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, iIBM ∈ I (see Proposition 1). Consequently, if γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄,
RO∗ > cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM will be an equilibrium.
When borrowing RO < cL, iIBM = iIBM = iLF − γ, see Proposition 1 and (16).
Inserting iIBM into (40), we get that borrowing RO < cL is optimal for those γ given by
(45). These γ are strictly larger than γ̄u, as (46) reveals. As γ̄u > γ̄ (see point a5 in this
proof), there is no active interbank market for γ > γ̄u, so that iIBM /∈ I. Hence, RO < cL
cannot be an equilibrium if γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄.
Consequently, if γ̄ = γ̄l < γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ > cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM will be the only
equilibrium. 
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(b) It has to be shown that if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ < cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM . It is
helpful to have a closer look at those relations between γ̄, γ̄l, γ̄u, and γ̄ differing from those
described in the proof of Proposition 3(a) first. Note again that we assume that either the
interest corridor or the distribution of t̃ is asymmetric or that both are symmetric.
b1. See a1.
b2. See a2.
b3. If γ̄ = γ̄u < γ̄ we will have that γ̄u < γ̄l, i.e. we will have an asymmetric interest
corridor or an asymmetric distribution of t̃:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
>
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
= γ̄u (66)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iRO
>
1−G(0)
G(0)
. (67)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (67) will be equal to 1. Then (52)
requires the RHS to be smaller than 1, implying that there must be an asymmetric
distribution of t̃. However, if there is a symmetric distribution of t̃, the RHS (67) will
equal 1. In this case, the LHS must be larger than 1, i.e. there must be an asymmetric
interest corridor. Consequently, γ̄ = γ̄u < γ̄ implies that we have either an asymmetric
interest corridor or an asymmetric distribution of t̃.
b4. Furthermore, γ̄u < γ̄l implies that γ̄u < γ̄:
γ̄u =
iLF − iRO
2G(0)
<
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄ (68)
⇒
iLF − iRO
iLF − iDF
< G(0). (69)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (69) will be 0.5. i.e. for γ̄u to be
smaller than γ̄, G(0) must be larger than 0.5. This is the case for γ̄u < γ̄l (see point
b3 in this proof): A symmetric interest corridor implies that the LHS of (67) equals
1, which requires the RHS of (67) to be smaller than 1, i.e. (1 − G(0)) < G(0) which
means that G(0) > 0.5. Consequently, (69) is fulfilled, so that γ̄u < γ̄ if γ̄u < γ̄l. Note
that (69) is also fulfilled for a symmetric distribution of t̃ and an asymmetric interest
corridor. The proof is analogous to the one presented in point a4 in this proof.
b5. Furthermore, γ̄u < γ̄l implies that γ̄l > γ̄:
γ̄l =
iRO − iDF
2(1−G(0))
>
iLF − iDF
2
= γ̄ (70)
⇒
iRO − iDF
iLF − iDF
> 1−G(0). (71)
If there is a symmetric interest corridor, the LHS of (71) will be 0.5. i.e. for γ̄l to be
larger than γ̄, (1−G(0)) must be smaller than 0.5. This is the case for γ̄u < γ̄l (see point
b3 in this proof): A symmetric interest corridor implies that the LHS of (67) equals 1,
i.e. (1−G(0)) < G(0) which means that (1−G(0)) < 0.5. Consequently, (71) is fulfilled,
so that γ̄l > γ̄ if γ̄u < γ̄l. Note that (71) is also fulfilled for a symmetric distribution of
t̃ and an asymmetric interest corridor. The proof is analogous to the one presented in
point a5 in this proof.
Having clarified the relation between the different γ, we are now in a position to proof
that RO∗ < cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄. As γ ≤ γ̄, we have an active
interbank market (see Proposition 1). Consequently, the FOC for optimal borrowing from
the refinancing operations is given by (40).
When borrowing RO = cL, G(t̄) equals G(0), and the interbank rate, which fulfills (40),
is ĩIBM , see proof of Proposition 1. However, as revealed by (42), for γ > γ̄u, ĩIBM /∈ I,
i.e. for γ > γ̄u, RO = cL cannot be an equilibrium.
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When borrowing RO > cL, iIBM = iIBM = iDF + γ, see Proposition 1 and (17).
Inserting iIBM into (40), we get that borrowing RO > cL is optimal for those γ given by
(43). These γ are strictly larger than γ̄l as (44) reveals. As γ̄l > γ̄ (see point b5 in this
proof), there is no active interbank market for γ > γ̄l, so that i
IBM /∈ I, so that RO > cL
cannot be an equilibrium if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄.
When borrowing RO < cL, iIBM = iIBM = iLF − γ, see Proposition 1 and (16).
Inserting iIBM into (40), we get that borrowing RO < cL is optimal for those γ given by
(45). These γ are strictly larger than γ̄u as (46) reveals. As γ̄u < γ̄ (see point b4 in this
proof), for γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄, iIBM ∈ I (see Proposition 1). Consequently, if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄,
RO∗ < cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM will be an equilibrium.
Consequently, if γ̄ = γ̄u < γ ≤ γ̄, RO∗ < cL∗ and iIBM∗ = iIBM will be the only
equilibrium. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
It has to be shown that if γ > γ̄,
RO∗ > cL∗ if G(0) < (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ),
RO∗ = cL∗ if G(0) = (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ),
RO∗ < cL∗ if G(0) > (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ).
As γ > γ̄ implies that we have an inactive interbank market (see Proposition 1), the FOC
for optimal borrowing from the refinancing operations given in Lemma 1 becomes
iDFG
(
t
)
+ iLF (1−G
(
t
)
) = iRO (72)
⇒
iLF − iRO
iLF − iDF
= G(t̄). (73)
Note that we assume that either the interest corridor or the distribution of t̃ is asymmetric or
that both are symmetric. If there is a symmetric interest corridor, (iLF−iRO)/(iLF−iDF ) =
0.5 and (73) requires that G(t̄) = 0.5. Consequently, considering the definition of t̄ given by
(7), we get from (73):
if G(0) = 0.5⇒ G(t̄) = G(0)⇒ t̄ = 0⇒ RO∗ = cL∗,
if G(0) > 0.5⇒ G(t̄) < G(0)⇒ t̄ < 0⇒ RO∗ < cL∗,
if G(0) < 0.5⇒ G(t̄) > G(0)⇒ t̄ > 0⇒ RO∗ > cL∗.
If there is a symmetric distribution of t̃, G(0) = 0.5. Consequently, considering the definition
of t̄ given by (7), we get from (73):
if (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ) = 0.5⇒ G(t̄) = 0.5 = G(0)⇒ t̄ = 0⇒ RO∗ = cL∗,
if (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ) > 0.5⇒ G(t̄) > 0.5 = G(0)⇒ t̄ > 0⇒ RO∗ > cL∗,
if (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ) < 0.5⇒ G(t̄) < 0.5 = G(0)⇒ t̄ < 0⇒ RO∗ < cL∗.
Therefore, we get that
RO∗ > cL∗ if G(0) < (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ),
RO∗ = cL∗ if G(0) = (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ),
RO∗ < cL∗ if G(0) > (iLF − iRO)/(iLF − iDF ).

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A.7 Proof of Result 1
Equilibrium I
It has to be shown that
∂L∗I
∂γ
=
−2φ(0)
λ
< 0. (74)
Considering Lemma 3, Proposition 2 and (23), L∗I is implicitly defined by
H(·)I := −iL + λL∗I + ciRO + φ(0)2γ, (75)
where φ(0) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
0
tbg(tb) dtb,
so that
∂H(·)I
∂γ
= 2φ(0) (76)
and
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= λ. (77)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗I
∂γ
= −
∂H(·)I
∂γ
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= −
2φ(0)
λ
< 0.

Equilibrium II
It has to be shown that
∂L∗II
∂γ
=
− 2φ(t
∗II )
λ
+
2(1−c)χt∗II (1−G(t∗II ))
λ
if t
∗II
> 0
− 2φ(t
∗II )
λ
− 2(1−c)χt
∗IIG(t∗II )
λ
if t
∗II
< 0
 < 0. (78)
The proof of (78) is more complex than the proof of (74) as t
∗II 6= 0. Therefore, we divide
the proof into four steps.
Step 1: Implicit definition of L∗II by H(·)II , determination of ∂H(·)II/∂L∗II
and ∂H(·)II/∂γ. Considering Lemma 3, Proposition 3 and (26), L∗II is implicitly defined
by
H(·)II := −iL + λL∗II + ciRO + φ(t∗II)2γ, (79)
where φ(t
∗II
) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
t∗II
tbg(tb) dtb, (80)
and t
∗II
=
RO∗II(...,L∗II , γ, ...)− cL∗II
(1− c)χL∗II
. (81)
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In Step 4, we will apply the implicit function theorem to obtain ∂L∗II/∂γ. Therefore, we
determine the first derivatives of H(·)II with respect to L∗II and γ first:
∂H(·)II
∂γ
= 2φ(t
∗II
)− 2γ(1− c)χt∗IIg(t∗II)
∂t
∗II
∂γ
, (82)
with
∂t
∗II
∂γ
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂γ
=
1
(1− c)χL∗II
∂RO∗II
∂γ
. (83)
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
= λ− 2γ(1− c)χt∗IIg(t∗II)
∂t
∗II
∂L∗II
, (84)
with
∂t
∗II
∂L∗II
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂L∗II
=
(
∂RO∗II
∂L∗II
− c
)
L∗II − (RO∗II − cL∗II)
(1− c)χ (L∗II)2
. (85)
Step 2: Implicit definition of RO∗II by Z(·)II , determination of ∂Z(·)II/∂γ,
∂Z(·)II/∂L∗II , and ∂Z(·)II/∂RO∗II . The first derivatives derived in Step 1 depend
on ∂RO∗II/∂L∗II and ∂RO∗II/∂γ, which are determined in this step. Considering Lemma
1 and Proposition 3, RO∗II is implicitly defined by
Z(·)II :=
{
−iRO + iDF + 2γ
∫ tmax
t∗II
g(tb) dtb if t
∗II
> 0,
−iRO + iLF − 2γ
∫ t∗II
tmin g(tb) dtb if t
∗II
< 0.
(86)
In order to be able to apply the implicit function theorem to get ∂RO∗II/∂L∗II and
∂RO∗II/∂γ, we determine the first derivatives of Z(·)II with respect to RO∗II , L∗II , γ:
∂Z(·)II
∂γ
=
{
2(1−G(t∗II)) if t∗II > 0,
−2G(t∗II) if t∗II < 0,
(87)
∂Z(·)II
∂L∗II
=
2γRO∗IIg(t
∗II
)
(1− c)χ(L∗II)2
for t
∗II ≷ 0, (88)
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
= −
2γg(t
∗II
)
(1− c)χL∗II
for t
∗II ≷ 0. (89)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗II
∂γ
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂γ
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
=

2(1−G(t∗II ))(1−c)χL∗II
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
− 2G(t
∗II )(1−c)χL∗II
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0,
(90)
∂RO∗II
∂L∗II
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂L∗II
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
=
RO∗II
L∗II
. (91)
Step 3: Inserting the results of Step 2 in those of Step 1. Inserting the results for
∂RO∗II/∂L∗II and ∂RO∗II/∂γ into (83) and (85) gives
∂t
∗II
∂γ
=

1−G(t∗II )
γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
− G(t
∗II )
γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0,
(92)
∂t
∗II
∂L∗II
= 0, (93)
which again means that (82) and (84) (first step) become
∂H(·)II
∂γ
=
{
2φ(t
∗II
)− (1− c)χt∗II2(1−G(t∗II)) if t∗II > 0,
2φ(t
∗II
) + (1− c)χt∗II2G(t∗II) if t∗II < 0,
(94)
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
= λ. (95)
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Step 4: Applying the implicit function theorem to get ∂L∗II/∂γ < 0. Applying the
implicit function theorem by using (94) and (95) yields
∂L∗II
∂γ
= −
∂H(·)II
∂γ
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
=
−
1
λ
[
2φ(t
∗II
)− 2(1− c)χt∗II(1−G(t∗II))
]
if t
∗II
> 0
− 1
λ
[
2φ(t
∗II
) + 2(1− c)χt∗IIG(t∗II)
]
if t
∗II
< 0
 < 0,
what had to be shown, see (78). However, with respect to the negative sign of ∂L∗II/∂γ we
still have to show that the terms in square brackets are positive:
2φ(t
∗II
)− 2(1− c)χt∗II(1−G(t∗II)) > 0 2φ(t∗II) + 2(1− c)χt∗IIG(t∗II) > 0
⇔
∫ tmax
t∗II
tbg(tb) dtb − t
∗II
(1−G(t∗II)) > 0 ⇔
∫ tmax
t∗II
tbg(tb) dtb + t
∗II
G(t
∗II
) > 0
⇔
∫ tmax
t∗ tbg(tb) dtb
1−G(t∗II)
> t
∗II ⇔ −
∫ t∗II
tmin
tbg(tb) dtb + t
∗II
G(t
∗II
) > 0
⇔ E[tb|tb > t
∗II
] > t
∗II ⇔ t∗II >
∫ t∗II
tmin tbg(tb) dtb
G(t
∗II
)
⇔ t∗II > E[tb|tb < t
∗II
]
As E[tb|tb > t
∗II
] > t
∗II
and t
∗II
> E[tb|tb < t
∗II
], the terms in square brackets are pos-
itive, so that ∂L∗II/∂γ < 0. Note with respect to the second transformation shown in the
right hand column that due to E[tb] = 0, we have that
∫ tmax
t∗II
tbg(tb) dtb = −
∫ t∗II
tmin tbg(tb) dtb.

Equilibrium III
Trivial, inactive interbank market.
A.8 Proof of Result 2
Equilibrium I
It has to be shown that
∂L∗I
∂χ
= −
φ(0)2γ
λχ
< 0. (96)
Partially differentiating H(·)I given by (75) w.r.t. χ, we get
∂H(·)I
∂χ
= (1− c)
∫ tmax
0
tbg(tb) dtb2γ =
φ(0)2γ
χ
. (97)
Considering (77) and (97), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗I
∂χ
= −
∂H(·)I
∂χ
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= −
φ(0)2γ
λχ
< 0.

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Equilibrium II
It has to be shown that
∂L∗II
∂χ
=
−φ(t∗II)2γ
λχ
< 0. (98)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: Partially differentiating H(·)II given by (79) w.r.t. χ, we get
∂H(·)II
∂χ
= (1− c)2γ
(∫ tmax
t∗II
tbg(tb) dtb − χt
∗II
g(t
∗II
)
∂t
∗II
∂χ
)
, (99)
where
∂t
∗II
∂χ
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂χ
=
∂RO∗II
∂χ
χ− (RO∗II − cL∗II)
(1− c)L∗IIχ2
. (100)
Step 2: Partially differentiating Z(·)II given by (86) w.r.t. χ, we get
∂Z(·)II
∂χ
=
g(t
∗II
)t
∗II
2γ
χ
for t
∗II ≷ 0. (101)
Considering (89) and (101), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗II
∂χ
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂χ
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
= t
∗II
(1− c)L∗II . (102)
Step 3: Inserting (102) into (100), we get
∂t
∗II
∂χ
= 0, (103)
and (99) simplifies to
∂H(·)II
∂χ
=
φ(t
∗II
)2γ
χ
. (104)
Step 4: Considering (95) and (104), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗II
∂χ
= −
∂H(·)II
∂χ
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
= −
φ(t
∗II
)2γ
λχ
< 0.
Equilibrium III
It has to be shown that
∂L∗III
∂χ
=
−φ(t∗III)
(
iLF − iDF
)
λχ
< 0. (105)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
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Step 1: Considering Lemma 3, Proposition 4 and (28), L∗III is implicitly defined by
H(·)III := −iL + λL∗III + ciRO + φ(t∗III)(iLF − iDF ), (106)
where φ(t
∗III
) = (1− c)χ
∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb (107)
and t
∗III
=
RO∗III(L∗III ,χ)− cL∗III
(1− c)χL∗III
. (108)
In Step 4, we will apply the implicit function theorem to obtain ∂L∗III/∂χ. Therefore, we
determine the first derivatives of H(·)III with respect to L∗III and χ first:
∂H(·)III
∂χ
= (1− c)(iLF − iDF )
(∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb − χt
∗II
g(t
∗III
)
∂t
∗III
∂χ
)
, (109)
with
∂t
∗III
∂χ
=
∂t
∗III
∂RO∗III
∂RO∗III
∂χ
=
∂RO∗III
∂χ
χ− (RO∗III − cL∗III)
(1− c)L∗IIIχ2
. (110)
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
= λ− (iLF − iDF )(1− c)χt∗IIIg(t∗III)
∂t
∗III
∂L∗III
, (111)
with
∂t
∗III
∂L∗III
=
∂t
∗III
∂RO∗III
∂RO∗III
∂L∗III
=
(
∂RO∗III
∂L∗III
− c
)
L∗III − (RO∗III − cL∗III)
(1− c)χ (L∗III)2
.
(112)
Step 2: Considering Lemma 1 and Proposition 4, RO∗III is implicitly defined by
Z(·)III := −iRO + iDF
∫ t∗III
tmin
g(tb) dtb + i
LF
∫ tmax
t∗III
g(tb) dtb. (113)
Partially differentiating Z(·)III w.r.t. χ, L∗III , and RO∗III we get
∂Z(·)III
∂χ
=
(iLF − iDF )g(t∗II)t∗III
χ
, (114)
∂Z(·)III
∂L∗III
=
(iLF − iDF )RO∗IIIg(t∗III)
(1− c)χ(L∗II)2
, (115)
∂Z(·)III
∂RO∗III
= −
(iLF − iDF )g(t∗III)
(1− c)χL∗III
. (116)
Applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗III
∂χ
= t
∗III
(1− c)L∗III , (117)
∂RO∗III
∂L∗III
= −
∂Z(·)III
∂L∗III
∂Z(·)III
∂RO∗III
=
RO∗III
L∗III
. (118)
Step 3: Inserting (117) and (118) into (110) and (112) yields
∂t
∗III
∂χ
= 0, (119)
∂t
∗III
∂L∗III
= 0, (120)
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and (109) and (111) simplify to
∂H(·)III
∂χ
=
φ(t
∗III
)(iLF − iDF )
χ
, (121)
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
= λ. (122)
Step 4: Considering (121) and (122), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗III
∂χ
= −
∂H(·)III
∂χ
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
= −
φ(t
∗III
)(iLF − iDF )
χλ
< 0.

A.9 Proof of Result 3
Equilibrium I
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1,
∂L∗I
∂iRO
= −
c
λ
< 0. (123)
Partially differentiating H(·)I given by (75) w.r.t. iRO, we get
∂H(·)I
∂iRO
= c. (124)
Considering (77) and (124), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗I
∂iRO
= −
∂H(·)I
∂iRO
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= −
c
λ
< 0.

Equilibrium II
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1,
∂L∗II
∂iRO
= −
c
λ
< 0. (125)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: Partially differentiating H(·)II given by (79) w.r.t. iRO, we get
∂H(·)II
∂iRO
= c− 2γ(1− c)χt∗IIg(t∗II)
∂t
∗II
∂iRO
, (126)
where
∂t
∗II
∂iRO
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iRO
=
1
(1− c)χL∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iRO
. (127)
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Step 2: Partially differentiating Z(·)II given by (86) w.r.t. iRO, considering that di
DF
diRO
=
diLF
diRO
= 1, we get
∂Z(·)II
∂iRO
= 0 for t
∗II ≷ 0. (128)
Considering (89) and (128), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗II
∂iRO
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂iRO
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
= 0. (129)
Step 3: Inserting (129) into (127), we get
∂t
∗II
∂iRO
= 0, (130)
and (126) simplifies to
∂H(·)II
∂iRO
= c. (131)
Step 4: Considering (95) and (131), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗II
∂iRO
= −
∂H(·)II
∂iRO
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
= −
c
λ
< 0.

Equilibrium III
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1,
∂L∗III
∂iRO
= −
c
λ
< 0. (132)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: Due to di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1 it follows from (106) that
∂H(·)III
∂iRO
= c− (iLF − iDF )(1− c)χt∗IIIg(t∗III)
∂t
∗III
∂iRO
, (133)
where
∂t
∗III∗
∂iRO
=
∂t
∗III
∂RO∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iRO
=
1
(1− c)χL∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iRO
, (134)
Step 2: Due to di
DF
diRO
= di
LF
diRO
= 1 it follows from (113) that
∂Z(·)III
∂iRO
= 0. (135)
Considering (135), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂RO∗III
∂iRO
= −
∂Z(·)III
∂iRO
∂Z(·)III
∂RO∗III
= 0. (136)
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Step 3: Inserting (136) into (134), we get
∂t
∗III
∂iRO
= 0, (137)
and (133) simplifies to
∂H(·)III
∂iRO
= c. (138)
Step 4: Considering (122) and (138), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗III
∂iRO
= −
∂H(·)III
∂iRO
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
= −
c
λ
< 0.

A.10 Proof of Result 4
Equilibrium I
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diLF
= −1,
∂L∗I
∂iLF
= 0. (139)
Partially differentiating H(·)I given by (75) w.r.t. iLF considering that di
DF
diLF
= −1 we get
∂H(·)I
∂iLF
= 0. (140)
Considering (77), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂L∗I
∂iLF
= −
∂H(·)I
∂iLF
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= 0. (141)

Equilibrium II
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diLF
= −1,
∂L∗II
∂iLF
= −
(1− c)χ|t∗II |
λ
< 0. (142)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: Due to di
DF
diLF
= −1 it follows from (79) that
∂H(·)II
∂iLF
= −2γ(1− c)χt∗IIg(t∗II)
∂t
∗II
∂iLF
, (143)
where
∂t
∗II
∂iLF
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iLF
=
1
(1− c)χL∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iLF
. (144)
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Step 2: Due to di
DF
diLF
= −1 it follows from (86) that
∂Z(·)II
∂iLF
=
{
−1 if t∗II > 0,
1 if t
∗II
< 0.
(145)
Considering (89) and (145), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗II
∂iLF
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂iLF
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
=

− (1−c)χL
∗II
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
(1−c)χL∗II
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0.
(146)
Step 3: Inserting (146) into (144), we get
∂t
∗II
∂iLF
=
−
1
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
1
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0,
(147)
and (143) simplifies to
∂H(·)II
∂iLF
=
{
(1− c)χt∗II if t∗II > 0,
−(1− c)χt∗II if t∗II < 0.
(148)
Step 4: Considering (95) and (148), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂L∗II
∂iLF
= −
∂H(·)II
∂iLF
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
=
− (1−c)χt
∗II
λ
if t
∗II
> 0
(1−c)χt∗II
λ
if t
∗II
< 0
 (149)
= −
(1− c)χ|t∗II |
λ
< 0 for t
∗II ≷ 0. (150)
With respect to the cross derivatives we have
∂2L∗II
∂iLF ∂χ
=
−
1−c
λ
[
t
∗II
+ χ ∂t
∗II
∂χ
]
if t
∗II
> 0
1−c
λ
[
t
∗II
+ χ ∂t
∗II
∂χ
]
if t
∗II
< 0
 = − (1− c)|t
∗II |
λ
< 0, (151)
∂2L∗II
∂iLF ∂γ
=

− (1−c)χ
λ
∂t∗II
∂γ
= − (1−c)χ(1−G(t
∗II )
λγg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0
(1−c)χ
λ
∂t∗II
∂γ
= − (1−c)χG(t
∗II )
λγg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
< 0
 < 0. (152)
Although RO∗II and L∗II change in χ (see (102) and (105)) and in γ (see (90) and (96)),
the change in L∗II does not evoke a change in t
∗II
(see (93)) due to a respective change in
RO∗II (see (91)). Consequently, with respect to ∂t
∗II
∂χ
∂t∗II
∂γ
it will be sufficient to focus on
∂t∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂χ
and ∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂γ
given by (100), (103), (83) and (92). 
Equilibrium III
It has to be shown that if di
DF
diLF
= −1,
∂2L∗III
∂iLF ∂χ
= −
2φ(t
∗III
)
λχ
< 0. (153)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
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proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: Due to di
DF
diLF
= −1 it follows from (106) that
∂H(·)III
∂iLF
= (1− c)χ
[
2
∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb − (iLF − iDF )t
∗II
g(t
∗III
)
∂t
∗III
∂iLF
]
, (154)
where
∂t
∗III
∂iLF
=
∂t
∗III
∂RO∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iLF
=
1
(1− c)χL∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iLF
. (155)
Step 2: Due to di
DF
diLF
= −1 it follows from (113) that
∂Z(·)III
∂iLF
= 1− 2G(t∗III). (156)
Considering (116) and (156), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂RO∗III
∂iLF
= −
∂Z(·)III
∂iLF
∂Z(·)III
∂RO∗III
=
(1− 2G(t∗III))(1− c)χL∗III
(iLF − iDF )g(t∗III)
= 0. (157)
Step 3: Inserting (157) into (155) and considering that due to the symmetric interest
corridor G(t
∗III
) = 1−G(t∗III) = 0.5 (see (27)), we get
∂t
∗III
∂iLF
= 0, (158)
and (154) simplifies to
∂H(·)III
∂iLF
= 2φ(t
∗III
). (159)
Step 4: Considering (122) and (159), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂L∗III
∂iLF
= −
∂H(·)III
∂iLF
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
= −
2φ(t
∗III
)
λ
< 0. (160)
For the cross derivative we get
∂2LIII∗III
∂iLF ∂χ
= −
2(1− c)
λ
(∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb − χt
∗III
g(t
∗III
)
∂t
∗III
∂χ
)
= −
2φ(t
∗III
)
λχ
< 0.
(161)
With respect to ∂t
∗III
/∂χ = 0 (see (119)), see analogously our comments on (151). 
A.11 Proof of Result 5
Equilibrium I
It has to be shown that
∂L∗I
∂iDF
= 0. (162)
Partially differentiating H(·)I given by (75) w.r.t. iDF we get
∂H(·)I
∂iDF
= 0. (163)
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Considering (77) and (163), and applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗I
∂iDF
= −
∂H(·)I
∂iDF
∂H(·)I
∂L∗I
= 0. (164)

Equilibrium II
It has to be shown that
∂L∗II
∂iDF
=
{
(1−c)χt∗II
λ
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(165)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: It follows from (79) that
∂H(·)II
∂iDF
= −2γ(1− c)χt∗IIg(tII∗)
∂t
∗II
∂iDF
, (166)
where
∂t
∗II
∂iDF
=
∂t
∗II
∂RO∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iDF
=
1
(1− c)χL∗II
∂RO∗II
∂iDF
. (167)
Step 2: It follows from (86) that
∂Z(·)II
∂iDF
=
{
1 if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(168)
Considering (89), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂RO∗II
∂iDF
= −
∂Z(·)II
∂iDF
∂Z(·)II
∂RO∗II
=

(1−c)χL∗II
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(169)
Step 3: Inserting (169) into (167), we get
∂t
∗II
∂iDF
=
{
1
2γg(t∗II )
if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0,
(170)
and (166) simplifies to
∂H(·)II
∂iDF
=
{
−(1− c)χt∗II if t∗II > 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(171)
Step 4: Considering (95) and (171), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗II
∂iDF
= −
∂H(·)II
∂iDF
∂H(·)II
∂L∗II
=
{
(1−c)χt∗II
λ
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0,
(172)
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which leads to
∂2L∗II
∂iDF ∂χ
=
 1−cλ
[
t
∗II
+ χ ∂t
∗II
∂χ
]
=
(1−c)t∗II
λ
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(173)
∂2L∗II
∂iDF ∂γ
=
 (1−c)χλ ∂t
∗II
∂γ
=
(1−c)χ(1−G(t∗II ))
λγg(t∗II )
> 0 if t
∗II
> 0,
0 if t
∗II
< 0.
(174)
With respect to ∂t
∗II
/∂χ and ∂t
∗II
/∂γ see analogously our comments on (151) and (152).

Equilibrium III
It has to be shown that
∂L∗III
∂iDF
=
φ(t∗III )
λ
+
(1−c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III )
λ
> 0, (175)
The single steps of this proof are analogous to those of the proof of (78). For a detailed
description of the following single steps of this proof we therefore refer the reader to the
proof of (78) described in Section A.7 in this appendix.
Step 1: It follows from (106) that
∂H(·)III
∂iDF
= (1− c)χ
[
−
∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb − (iLF − iDF )t
∗III
g(t
∗III
)
∂t
∗III
∂iDF
]
, (176)
where
∂t
∗III
∂iDF
=
∂t
∗III
∂RO∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iDF
=
1
(1− c)χL∗III
∂RO∗III
∂iDF
. (177)
Step 2: It follows from (113) that
∂Z(·)III
∂iDF
= G(t
∗III
). (178)
Considering (116), applying the implicit function theorem thus yields
∂RO∗III
∂iDF
= −
∂Z(·)III
∂iLF
∂Z(·)III
∂RO∗III
=
G(t
∗III
(1− c)χL∗III
(iLF − iDF )g(t∗III)
. (179)
Step 3: Inserting (179) into (177), we get
∂t
∗III
∂iDF
=
G(t
∗III
)
(iLF − iDF )g(t∗III)
, (180)
and (176) simplifies to
∂H(·)III
∂iDF
= −φ(t∗III)− (1− c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III). (181)
Step 4: Considering (122) and (181), applying the implicit function theorem yields
∂L∗III
∂iDF
= −
∂H(·)III
∂iDF
∂H(·)III
∂L∗III
=
(1− c)χ
[∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb + t
∗III
G(t
∗III
)
]
λ
=
φ(t
∗III
) + (1− c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III)
λ
> 0, (182)
52 Monika Bucher et al.
so that
∂2L∗III
∂iDF ∂χ
=
(1− c)
λ
[(∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb + t
∗III
G(t
∗III
)
)
+χ
(
−t∗IIIg(t∗III)
∂t
∗III
∂χ
+
∂t
∗III
∂χ
G(t
∗III
)− t∗IIIg(t∗III)
∂t
∗III
∂χ
)]
=
φ(t
∗III
) + (1− c)χt∗IIIG(t∗III)
λχ
> 0. (183)
With respect to ∂t
∗III
/∂χ = 0 (see (119)), see analogously our comments on (151). Note
that the term
∫ tmax
t∗III
tbg(tb) dtb + t
∗III
G(t
∗III
) > 0 (see notes to (96)). 
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Bräuning F, Fecht F (2017) Relationship Lending in the Interbank Market and the Price of
Liquidity. Review of Finance 21(1):33–75
Campbell JY (1987) Money announcements, the demand for bank reserves, and the behav-
ior of the federal funds rate within the statement week. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 19(1):56–67
Cassola N, Huetl M (2010) The euro overnight interbank market and ECB’s liquidity man-
agement policy during tranquil and turbulent times. Paper presented at the ECB Work-
shop on ”Challenges to Monetary Policy Implementation beyond the Financial Market
Turbulence”, in Frankfurt/Main, Germany on 1 December 2009
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